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Federalism in the Era of International
Standards: Federal and State Government
Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United
States (Part III)*
CRAIG H. ALLEN**
VI
PROBLEMS IN THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO MARITIME
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The traditional approach to questions involving displacement of state laws
regulating merchant vessels and their crews has become cumbersome and
unpredictable. 7 17 At best, preemption doctrines are flexible and responsive;
more commonly, they are rife with inconsistencies and subject to shifting
judicial attitudes toward federalism. The traditional preemption approachfashioned for the most part from precedents addressed to grain elevators,
avocado quality, and meat packaging-often fails to recognize federal
primacy in foreign affairs, the regulation of foreign commerce and maritime
affairs, and the weight that should be given to those interests in preemption
challenges to state regulation of merchant vessels. It often ignores or
downplays the nation's treaty obligations and foreign policy objectives. The
traditional approach does not provide a consistent frame of reference for
analyzing preemption challenges, directing the courts to examine alternately
the relevant federal and state laws' subject, their purpose, and their object.
The traditional approach invokes a presumption against preemption of a
state's exercise of its "historic" police powers, but provides little guidance
for determining the scope of the state police powers or which are "historic."
*Editor's Note: This is the third part of a four part article. Part I appeared in the July 1998 issue and
examined the constitutional allocation of federal and state powers relevant to the regulation of merchant
vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention. Part 11appeared in the October 1998 issue and
examined the principal intemational agreements and U.S. statutes that are relevant in a preemption
analysis. Part IV, which will propose a new method of maritime preemption analysis, will be published
in a future issue of the Journal.
**Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Marine Affairs Program, University of
Washington (Seattle). J.D., University of Washington.
7 7
The "traditional approach" is described in l1L.B.2 of Part I of this article.
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Finally, no attempt has yet been made by the courts to reconcile the approach
to preemption in the regulation of the primary conduct 71 8 of merchant
vessels and their crews with the closely related issue of application of state
law to private litigation involving those same vessels.
Drawing on the background laid in the first and second parts of this
article, this part discusses the principal weaknesses in the traditional
approach to preemption. Although the analysis focuses primarily on preemption doctrines, it is necessary to also examine how the courts have
applied the doctrines in order to appreciate the weaknesses in the traditional
approach. Thus, the article will examine three federal decisions in which the
approach followed produced results that are at odds with international law,
congressional policy choices on uniformity and reciprocity, or the Supreme
Court's maritime precedents. The fourth part of the article will propose a
new approach to maritime preemption analysis and apply that approach to
several contemporary regulatory issues.

A. The TraditionalApproach is Poorly Suited to Merchant Vessel
Safety Regulation

The U.S. approach to most environmental protection and coastal zone
management programs has been one of cooperative federalism. Federal
environmental legislation sets minimum nationwide standards for water and
air quality, while leaving the states free to enact more stringent requirements
should they choose to do so. 7 19 Federal and state agencies often work
together to enforce environmental standards, and for decades federal and
state governments have contributed the funds necessary to restore or
improve the quality of the environment. When Congress establishes a
program of cooperative federalism, courts are unlikely to conclude that state
laws frustrate the purposes and objectives of the federal regime. 720 However,
neither the Constitution nor existing federal statutes prescribe a program of
cooperative federalism for the regulation of merchant vessels. Any preemption analysis of regulations governing the primary conduct of merchant
vessels and their crews must respect this distinction.
The parallel but distinct development of the Federal Water Pollution
71

8"Primary conduct" refers to the out of court behavior of ships and sailors. See Ballard Shipping Co.
v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 629-30 n.4, 1994 AMC 2705 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), for the suggestion that "uniformity is most important where the rule
at issue is one governing primary conduct").
7 19
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(c), 1342(b), 1344(g) & 1370 (establishing cooperative federal-state
program
for water pollution control).
72
0Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614-15 (1991).
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Control Act (FWPCA) 72 I and the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) 722 on the one hand, and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(PWSA) 723 and the Port and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA), 724 on the other,
highlights the differing treatment Congress gave to regulation of pollutant
discharges into state waters and vessel safety and vessel-source pollution
prevention. The 1972 FWPCA (now the Clean Water Act (CWA)) and the
CZMA embrace a cooperative approach. The CWA expressly permits states
to enact stricter water quality standards and preserves the states' authority to
establish additional oil spill liability and cleanup requirements. 725 Congress
has never however prescribed a cooperative federalism approach to regulation of merchant vessels. In contrast to the CWA and the CZMA (a contrast
noted by the Supreme Court726), the PWSA and its 1978 PTSA amendments
recognize the primacy of the federal government in maritime affairs and in
the negotiation and implementation of the governing international conventions on merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention.
Although states are free under the PWSA to establish safety standards for
structuresthat are stricter than federal standards, the Act impliedly preempts
state regulation of the construction, design, and equipment standards for
vessels covered by Title II of the Act. Moreover, once the federal
government has exercised its authority to control the operation of vessels or
waterways under Title I of the PWSA, state laws on the same subject are
displaced. Such was the understanding in 1978, when the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 727 The Court
rejected state arguments that the FWPCA or CZMA provide a basis for the
states to regulate maritime subjects that were preempted by the PWSA or
PTSA. 728 Unfortunately, any peace Ray may have brought to the maritime
federalism debate was short-lived, as Justice White witnessed in reviewing

72

1Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896 (1972), codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.

722

pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464.

723

Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972), codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 and 46 U.S.C. §§
3701-3718.
724
Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978).
725
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(o)(2) & 1370; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 489, 1984
AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985
AMC
2395 (1985).
726
The Supreme Court recognized the contrast in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
178 n.28, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (observing that, while the FWPCA [the predecessor to the CWA],
Coastal Zone Management Act, and Deepwater Port Act "contemplate cooperative federal-state
regulatory efforts, they expressly state that intent, in contrast to the PWSA").
7 27
See supra Part II, V.B.3, particularly notes 633-42 and accompanying text.
72
8Ray, 435 U.S. at 178 n.28.
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the State of Alaska's regulation of tank ship ballast water, discussed
729
below.
1. The TraditionalApproach Fails to Recognize the Importance of
Foreign Relations Laws in Merchant Vessel Safety Regulation
Chief Justice Warren articulated a three-part test for preemption in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson.7 30 In addition to the familiar "actual conflict" test,
Nelson requires lower courts to examine the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme and to determine whether the need for national uniformity
necessitates a finding that the federal government has occupied the field.7 3'
It is in these latter two inquiries that the foreign relations laws of the U.S.
should play a pivotal role in a court's preemption analysis of state
regulations on merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention. International law, particularly the IMO-sponsored conventions, is a
732
major component of the federal regulatory scheme for merchant vessels.
However, no court has yet attempted a comprehensive analysis of the
principal IMO conventions and their port State control provisions in a
maritime preemption analysis. By overlooking or ignoring relevant international conventions binding on the U.S., and the objects and policies they
embrace, the courts are more apt to reach the conclusion that the overall
federal regulatory regime is not "pervasive," and, therefore, does not occupy
the field of merchant vessel safety or pollution prevention. When courts fail
to consider the international regime comprehensively in the "conflict" step
of their preemption analysis, they will also omit from the analysis the
purposes of both the President and the Congress in negotiating and ratifying
the IMO conventions. Finally, by omitting from their conflict analysis the
purposes underlying the international conventions, the court is more likely to
conclude that the state regulation under challenge does not stand as an
obstacle to any federal purpose.7 33 This narrow view of the breadth and
7 29

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985) (White. J., dissenting

from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
730350 U.S. 497 (1956).
73
Id.
732

at 502-05.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1987) (holding that in examining whether
a state statute is preempted, a court must look to federal law as a whole and to the federal law's object
and policy). International law is an integral component of "federal law." See The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S.733677, 700 (1900).
Such a narrow view conflicts with the canon that treaties are interpreted liberally to effectuate the
manifest purposes and object sought to be achieved by the participating countries, in order that all
potential rights and claims under them may be given full force and effect. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. (10 Otto) 483 (1879); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S.

424 (1902).
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purposes of international maritime law may explain the Ninth Circuit's
decisions in the Hammond and Intertanko cases discussed below.
In 1978, the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for the nation to
speak with "one voice" on matters of tank vessel design and construction in
the international community. 734 The SOLAS convention and the coming
MARPOL convention required nothing less at the time. Subsequent negotiations to amend those conventions and to reach new international agreements on the qualifications and watchstanding of merchant mariners (the
STCW Convention) and ship safety management systems (the ISM Code)
similarly required that the nation speak with one voice. Yet, the Ninth
Circuit, in the Intertanko decision discussed below, upheld state regulations
that varied significantly from international requirements prescribed by the
STCW Convention and the ISM Code. Lower courts too often fail to
recognize that the nation's obligations under the IMO conventions require
that the nation's standards and inspection practices for foreign vessels
7 35
conform to the conventions' prescriptions as a matter of international law,
absent an appropriate exception or reservation by the national government.

73 6

Actions taken against foreign vessels, like actions against foreign citizens,
may have far-reaching international relations implications for the national
governments involved. 737 In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court
observed that one of the "most important and delicate of all international
relationships" is the protection of the rights of the country's nationals when
they are in another country. 738 The U.S. and other flag States have long
demonstrated a similar national solicitude for vessels flying their flag while
those vessels are abroad.7 39 State laws that deny entry to, provide for
734

Ray, 435 U.S. at 166.
5ee supra Part I, notes 221-22 (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

735

736

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra part 1, note 221, art. 17(1) ("the consent of
a State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits or the other contracting
States so agree"). It is well-established that "A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is of
all the United States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 236 (1796); see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). The Supreme Court
has held in a case involving only domestic law that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone
in every preemption case." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Although the Court speaks of "Congressional" intent and "legislative" history, not
all "federal" law under the Supremacy Clause is made by Congress. For international agreements entered
into under the President's Article II treaty power, it is the President's and Senate's intent that are relevant.
737
Significantly, nothing in the legislative record of the 1991 Washington tanker laws at issue in the
Intertanko v. Locke suit, discussed below, indicates that the state considered the possible foreign relations
implications of its statutes. The Act does, however, require that it be implemented in a manner consistent
with federal law. Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.020.
...
312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).
739
See supra Part I, note 94 and accompanying text (describing U.S. actions against foreign nations
for interference with U.S. vessels).
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detention of, or impose additional burdens on foreign vessels while in U.S.
ports or waters, beyond those requirements imposed by federal law or
treaties to which the U.S. is party, affect the entire nation. "[E]ven though
they may be intended to accomplish a local purpose, they provoke questions
in the field of international relations. 7 40
2. The Growing Reluctance to Scrutinize State Legislation Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine Omits Vital National Interests from
the Preemption Analysis

Beginning with Gibbons v. Odgen in 1824, 74 1analysis of federal and state
authority under the Commerce Clause has played a prominent role in most
Supreme Court decisions on maritime preemption. The Court has recognized
a "paramount federal concern" in the activities of interstate carriers, 742 and
a "special need for uniformity" in foreign commerce. 743 Similarly, Congress
acknowledged the "long history of preemption in maritime safety matters
...founded on the need for uniformity applicable to vessels moving in
interstate commerce. ' 744 But recent cases reveal a growing reluctance by the
federal courts to scrutinize state regulations under the Commerce Clause, to
evaluate their impact on uniformity. After studying several of the Supreme
Court's recent admiralty decisions, one commentator similarly concluded
that, in the private maritime law arena, "[t]he protection of maritime
commerce through uniform national rules is not what it used to be." 74 5 If the

dormant Commerce Clause doctrine yet has vitality, it has for the most part
been effectively limited to cases alleging discriminatory treatment of
746
interstate or foreign commerce.
Gibbons and Cooley v. Board of Wardens,747 the Court's seminal

Commerce Clause cases, both examined a state's regulation of vessels
74°Hzes, 312 U.S. at 66; see also Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the
Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Comell L.Q. 12, 20-21 (1949) ("holding a ship and its crew
in an American port, to which they may have come to do no more than refuel, may, in the eyes of the
nation of the flag be deemed an undue interference with her commerce, and a violation of that 'comity
and delicacy' which in the more courtly days of some of the earlier cases were considered normal among
nations").
74'22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
742
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1963).

74 3

Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
744S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1341.
745
Friedell, Searching for a Compass, supra Part I, note 17, at 845.
746
See, e.g., Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1194, 1995 AMC 1763 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the
dormant Commerce Clause, in a case involving a challenge to a state's vessel anchoring regulations, as
a two-tiered approach, which did not include an inquiry into whether the subject was national or one
which required a uniform national rule).
74753 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Both cases are examined supra Part I, in III.A.I.
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engaged in maritime commerce. The Court held in Cooley that nothing in the
Commerce Clause precludes a state from enacting laws addressed to "local"
concerns; that is, to matters that are not national in their nature or which do
not require a uniform national rule. When Cooley is read together with Kelly
v. Washington,74 8 one may reasonably conclude that the construction,
design, equipment, and internal operations of merchant vessels engaged in
international or interstate commerce are "national" subjects, or subjects that
require uniform national rules. 749 In Kelly, the Court adopted a "uniformity
versus locality" approach to Commerce Clause analysis. 7 50 The Kelly
opinion points out that Congress had been warned of the need to regulate the
class of boats that had become the subject of the Washington state
regulations, but Congress had so far failed to act. Faced with a dangerous
lacuna in the federal vessel regulatory scheme, the Court upheld the state's
decision to step in. The Court noted, however, that an Article VI preemption
analysis would have been "unnecessary and inapposite if the subject is one
demanding uniformity of regulation." 75' In that class of cases, the Court
held, "the Constitution occupies the field even if there is no federal
legislation. 7' 52 In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Court again applied the
familiar Cooley test to the Washington State requirement that tankers in state
waters employ an escort tug. 753 The state requirement was upheld against a
Commerce Clause challenge only after the Court concluded that it addressed
754
a "local" need in a particular body of water.
Some argue that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which has
played an important role in analyzing the role of state regulation of merchant
vessels, is obsolete. 755 Justice Scalia openly questions the constitutional
legitimacy of the doctrine. 756 But any decision to eliminate the doctrine must
recognize the strong federal interest in interstate commerce and the need for
uniformity in foreign commerce that the doctrine's precedents have pro74'302 U.S. 1, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937).
749

See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 n.15, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
Kelly, 302 U.S. at 15; see also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949) (holding that "the
familiar test is that of uniformity versus locality. If a case falls within an area in commerce thought to
demand a uniform national rule, state action is struck down. If the activity is one of predominately local
interest, state action is sustained").
750

751

Kelly, 302 U.S. at 9.
7521d.
753

Ray, 435 U.S. at 179 (holding that a tug escort requirement is not the type of regulation that
a uniform national rule).
requires
7
54

1d.
75 5

Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982).
justice Scalia has concluded that "[t]he historical record provides no grounds for reading the
Commerce Clause to be other than what it says-an authorization for Congress to regulate Commerce."
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in pan).
756

92

Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce

Vol. 30, No. I

tected, particularly in maritime preemption analysis, and ensure those
interests are fairly incorporated into the surviving Article VI preemption
757
analysis.
3. The TraditionalApproach Turns Almost Exclusively on the Court's
Characterizationof Legislative Purpose, But Provides Little Guidance on
How the Purpose Should Be Determined
The trend in decisions over the past two centuries reveals a gradual
about-face in the Supreme Court's approach to "occupation of the field"
analysis. In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall intimated his agreement with
Daniel Webster's argument in Gibbons that the federal commerce power is
exclusive, occupying the field as a matter of constitutional law. 758 In 1852,
the Court in Cooley adopted the "selectively exclusive" position on the
Commerce Clause, 759 but left open the question whether any federal
legislation by Congress on a subject would effectively occupy the field,
displacing all state law on that same subject. In 1913, Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court in Charleston & Western Central Railway Co. v.
Varnville Furniture Co., answered the question left open in Cooley in the
affirmative, holding that "[w]hen Congress has taken the particular subject
matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is
not to be declared a help because it attempts to go further than Congress has
seen fit to go."' 7 60 Even Justice Brandeis, who championed the role of the
states as "laboratories of democracy," held for a unanimous Court in Napier
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. that Congress had occupied the field of
railroad locomotive safety by delegating to the Interstate Commerce Commission authority over the subject without expressly saving state regulatory
authority within the statute. 76' As recently as 1947, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.,762 the Court held that the test for displacement of state law
is "whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way
757

1n arguing that a negative Commerce Clause doctrine was still needed, Justice Jackson observed
that "The practical result is that in default of actions by us [the states] will go on suffocating and retarding
and Balkanizing American commerce, trade and industry." Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400
(1941) (Jackson, J.,concurring).
75

8See supra Part I, note 147 and accompanying text.

759

See supra Part I, note 154 and accompanying text.
760237 U.S. 597 (1915).
761272 U.S. 605, 612 (1926). In later comments on the Napierdecision written to Justice Frankfurter,
Justice Brandeis stated that "I think the states could be taught, ... if they wish to reserve their police
power, they should, through the 'state block' in Congress, see to it in every class of Congressional
legislation that the state rights which they desire to preserve be expressly provided for in the acts." Letter
from Louis Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter, Nov. 30, 1926, in 5 M. Urofsky & D. Levy, Letters of Louis
D. Brandeis 47 (1975).
762331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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regulated by the Federal act." If it is, the federal scheme prevails though it
763
is a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State.
Two years later, however, in Californiav. Zook, a bare majority of the Court
abandoned the Varnville-Rice approach in a decision criticized by the
prominent dissenters. 764 Under the majority's decision in Zook, federal
legislation on a "subject" would no longer automatically displace state law
on the same subject. To determine whether state law is displaced, courts
would henceforth examine not just the "subject" regulated by the respective
federal and state laws, but Congress' "purpose" in the legislation 765 and
whether the state regulation conflicted with the federal law.
How the court characterizes the "subject" and "purpose" of the respective
federal and state laws at issue may well dictate the outcome of the case, yet there
766
is conflicting guidance on how the characterization should be conducted.
In its 1963 decision in FloridaLime, a narrowly divided Court held that the
preemption analysis does not turn on whether the state and federal
legislation "aimed at similar or different objectives," but whether both
regulations may operate "without impairing the federal superintendence of
thefield. ' 767 Yet, in attempting to reconcile its precedents fifteen years later
in Ray, the Court appeared to return to a "purpose" test, observing that in
"none of the relevant cases sustaining the application of state laws to
federally licensed or inspected vessels did the federal licensing or inspection
procedure implement a substantive rule of federal law addressed to the
763

1d. at 236 (emphasis added).
764Califoria v. Zook. 336 U.S. 841, 853 (1949) (Burton, Douglas & Jackson, JJ., dissenting). The
dissenters argued for a contrary presumption, providing that "[olnce Congress has lawfully exercised its
legislative supremacy in one of its allotted fields and has not accompanied that exercise with an
indication of its consent to share it with the states, the burden of overcoming the supremacy of the federal
law in that field is upon any state seeking to do so." Id.
5
76 The "purpose" analysis is often applied inconsistently with the Court's seminal precedent. In Rice,
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that:
The question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was. Congress legislated here in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways....
331 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added). Thus, the "purpose" the Court was referring to is not the overall
legislative intent, but rather whether Congress had as a "purpose" preemption of state law.
766
As Justice Stone observed in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (Stone, J.,
dissenting):
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated formula that Congress by
"occupying the field" has excluded from it all state legislation. Every Act of Congress occupies
some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded
a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution. To discover the boundaries
we look to the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting'and its legislative
history.
767
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (emphasis added).
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object also sought to be achieved by the challenged state regulation. 768
Whether preemption is to turn on an overlap of "subject," "object" or
"purpose," or on interference with "federal superintendence of the field," is
crucial to the analysis. Virtually every state regulation of merchant vessel
safety can also be characterized as having a "pollution prevention" purpose.
Thus, federal legislation on the subject of vessel construction, design,
equipment, and manning (CDEM), but having, by the court's characterization, a purpose other than pollution prevention, would not occupy the field
769
of pollution prevention addressed by the challenged state law.
The court's characterization of the federal regulation's purpose remains
important beyond the court's implied preemption analysis. When the court
turns to "conflict" preemption analysis, it must determine whether the state
law stands as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the "full
purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 770 The court's characterization of the
federal purposes and objectives is critical in the conflict inquiry, and the
court's analysis disserves the federal interest if the court fails to consider all
relevant purposes. As shown in the following section, courts too often fail to
consider the congressional and presidential purposes in pursuing an international approach to vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention
and in encouraging reciprocal exemptions from port State control of vessel
standards. More fundamentally, the lower courts often fail to recognize the
quid pro quo incentive in the international regime for merchant vessel safety
and pollution prevention, its importance to the efforts to avoid an international "race to the bottom" by substandard vessels, and the related "purpose"
of the federal government in ratifying the treaties composing that regime.
The traditional preemption analysis has so far expended little effort on
defining the scope of the states' historic police powers. Legislation grounded
on the state's "historic" police powers benefits from the important presumption against preemption. 77' Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated in a
case challenging a state police power law that it will narrowly construe
preemption clauses in federal statutes. 772 No cases found have examined
768435 U.S. at 164-65 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446, 1960 AMC
1549
(1960), and Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 8, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937)) (emphasis added).
76 9
Of course, an intent to occupy the field may be inferred from other considerations. See Ray, 435
U.S.77 at
157-58.
0
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
77 1
See supra Part 1, note Ill (citing Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie); Robertson, Displacement
of State Law, supra Part I, note 17, at 341 (labeling the concept of the "traditional police powers of the
states" one of "notoriously uncertain meaning").
772Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). By contrast, in two prominent maritime cases,
the Court narrowly construed state law saving clauses. See supra Part I, notes 278-80 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's analysis of saving clauses in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire and Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp.).
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whether regulation of merchant vessel safety is within the states' police
powers, historic or otherwise. 773 One court has held that aviation safety is
not one of the historic police powers of the states. 774 It may be similarly
argued that regulation of construction and design of vessels or primary
conduct on merchant vessels is outside the historic police powers of the
states. Subjects requiring uniform national standards, which are beyond state
legislative competence under cases such as Kelly, could not be within the
states' historic police powers, and should not benefit from the presumption
against preemption. It is also unclear why a court would continue to apply
a presumption of validity to a state's regulation if the Supreme Court has
ruled in an earlier case that state laws on that subject or having that purpose
are preempted. 775 Judicial economy and the principle of stare decisis might
instead justify eliminating or even reversing the presumption in such cases.
B. The National Judgment as "Law of the Land"
In setting safety standards for vessels navigating U.S. waters, the federal
government has frequently been tom between pursuing uniform international standards and taking unilateral action. 776 The decision presents a
foreign policy choice for the national government. The former approach
seeks to prevent a "race to the bottom" in vessel safety and pollution
prevention standards, obtain reciprocal treatment for U.S. merchant and
naval vessels, and facilitate the maritime trade and transportation on which
the nation depends. The latter, "go-it-alone," approach may provide a higher
degree of safety and protection for U.S. waters, but may come at the price
of reduced protection for the rest of the planet-particularly the oceans
beyond national jurisdiction-and a loss of reciprocity for U.S. vessels
abroad. State laws do not always reflect the same judgment on the merits of
international versus unilateral national, or even regional or local, regulation.
The extent to which the federal judgment will be the supreme "Law of the
Land" under Article VI lies at the heart of federalism disputes over merchant
vessel regulation.
773

The Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937),
suggests that the states entered the field of vessel safety regulation rather recently, to fill actual or
perceived gaps in the federal regulatory scheme.
774
Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 337, 351 (D.V.I. 1997).
775
For example, the Ninth Circuit began its preemption analysis in Intertanko v. Locke by invoking
the presumption against preemption, even though the Supreme Court had previously held in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. that state regulation of tank vessel, design, equipment, and safety standards were

preempted. See infra 1VI.C.2.
776

Meese, When Jurisdictional Interests Collide: International, Domestic, and State Efforts to Prevent
Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 12 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 71, 94-95 (1982).
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1. The National Judgment to Adopt Uniform, InternationalStandards and
Limited Port State Control
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the U.S. has jurisdiction
under international law to prescribe and enforce national requirements with
respect to foreign vessels voluntarily in U.S. ports or internal waters. 777 But,
as the Supreme Court observed in Cunard S.S. v. Mellon, a port State "may
out of considerations of public policy choose to forego the exertion of its
jurisdiction or to exert the same in only a limited way. '778 As a matter of
public policy and foreign policy, the U.S. has in fact chosen to limit its port
State role in many respects, by becoming party to the IMO conventions.
The LOS Convention requires States-parties to cooperate in regional and/or
global efforts to develop international standards and rules to combat vesselsource pollution. 779 The most remarkable development in the regulation. of
merchant vessel safety and pollution prevention over the past two decades has,
in fact, been the increasingly dominant role of international law, developed
under the auspices of the IMO. The Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention
(TSPP) Conference, called by the U.S. in 1978,780 heralded a fundamental shift
toward a global approach to merchant vessel safety and pollution prevention.
Three developments in that year (discussed in Part II of this article) irrevocably
transformed vessel regulation for all maritime nations. First, the IMO passed
much needed protocols to the MARPOL and SOLAS conventions. That same
year, the IMO member nations reached international agreement on the new
STCW convention, which provided qualification and training standards for
merchant vessel officers and crewmembers. Finally, while reaffirming their
commitment to toughen international rules and standards, the 1978 TSPP
conferees also recognized the need for port State control authority, to ensure that
vessels complied with the international standards while in foreign ports. The
1982 LOS Convention, many provisions of which were forged in the same
international milieu that led to the 1978 SOLAS and MARPOL protocols,
recognizes the central importance of international standards, to be enforced
principally by flag States, while reserving to port States well-defined authority
to identify and take action against sub-standard foreign vessels. The U.S.
government's decision to join this international legal regime, through treaties
that are now Law of the Land, fundamentally altered maritime federalism in the
nation.
In numerous statutes, Congress has expressed its judgment that a foreign
77 7

Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923).
7781d.;
see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 1953 AMC 1210 (1953); Restatement, supra Part
I, note
19,
§ 152 n.3.
779
LOS Convention, supra Part 1I, note 384, art. 211.
78°The TSPP developments are discussed supra Part II, note 611 and accompanying text.
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vessel's compliance with international standards for merchant vessel safety
and pollution prevention will satisfy U.S. requirements for entering U.S.
ports or waters. 78' Several interests animated the U.S. decision to ratify the
1978 MARPOL and SOLAS protocols and the STCW Convention, and to
acknowledge the binding force of the legal principles embodied in the 1982
LOS Convention. The U.S., like all maritime nations, shares a common
interest in protecting the world's oceans and the ports and waters of all
nations. The common interest is served in large part by heading off the
potential "race to bottom" in international shipping standards. 782 Many
believe that in the absence of uniform international standards, substandard
ships will be drawn to lax flag States and port States, to avoid the more
demanding legal regimes.
Lack of uniformity in merchant vessel standards may also undermine a
nation's maritime commerce. 783 The nation's interest in uniformity may be
a "primary function" of entering into an international convention. 784 The
U.S. State Department, commenting on the proposed 1978 Port and Tanker
Safety Act, reported to Congress that adopting international standards for
merchant vessels would "enable the United States to avoid a conflicting
patchwork of national standards that would impede the free-flow of
commerce. '"785 While proclaiming the U.S. exclusive economic zone in
78 1

See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3303(a) ("A foreign country is considered to have inspection laws and
standards similar to those of the United States when it is a party to an International Convention for Safety
of Life at Sea to which the United States is currently a party"); 46 U.S.C. § 3711 ("The Secretary may
accept any part of a certificate, endorsement, or document issued by the government of a foreign country
under a treaty, convention, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, as a
basis for issuing a [U.S.] certificate of compliance"); see also 46 U.S.C. § 5109 (extending reciprocity
under International Convention on Load Lines); 46 U.S.C. § 14306 (extending reciprocity under
International Tonnage Convention). Similarly, the Department of Transportation concluded in its 1996
Statement of Regulatory Priorities that "[t]hrough Coast Guard initiatives at the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), international standards have been raised to a level comparable with U.S. domestic
requirements."
U.S. Dep't of Transp., Unified Agenda, Nov. 29, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,111 (DOT 1996).
782Early proponents of the trend toward federalization of environmental law argued that only federal
rules would head off a "race to the bottom" by states that might otherwise be tempted to lower their
environmental standards to attract commercial activities. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196
(1977); Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is there a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"?, 48
Hastings L.J. 271 (1997) (concluding that evidence points toward an affirmative answer to both questions
raised
in the article's title).
783
Fitch, Unilateral Action Versus Universal Evolution of Safety and Environmental Protection
Standards in Maritime Shipping of Hazardous Cargoes, 20 Harv. Int'l L.J. 127, 160 (1979) (concluding
that individual, national standards governing the design, construction, equipment, and manning of vessels
could greatly impede the flow of world ocean commerce).
784Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 230, 1996 AMC 319 (1996) (concluding that
undoubtedly it was a "primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in the law of
international
air travel") (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)).
78 5
Letter from Douglas J. Bennett, Jr. (Asst. Sec'y for Cong. Affairs) to Cong. John Murphy (Chair,
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1983, President Reagan affirmed the nation's commitment to pursuing a
7 86
uniform, international approach to regulation of merchant shipping.
In concluding that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act evinced an intent
that the "Nation was to speak with one voice with respect to tanker-design
standards," 787 the Supreme Court observed that the Act's legislative history
revealed a "decided congressional preference for arriving at international
standards for building tank vessels. '788 The Senate Report cited by the Court
concluded that "multilateral action with respect to comprehensive standards
for the design, construction, maintenance and operation of tankers for the
protection of the marine environmental would be far preferable to unilateral
imposition of standards." 789 The foreign relations implications of a decision
to pursue unilateral action against foreign vessels are apparent in the
legislative history of the PWSA: the Departments of State and Transportation joined twelve foreign nations in expressing concern over unilateral
action. 790 As shown in the following section, by agreeing to the international
conventions, the U.S. is also able to obtain favorable, reciprocal treatment
for its own vessels and to preserve the navigational mobility so important to
its naval forces.
State regulation of primary conduct of merchant vessels "presents the
most direct risk of conflict between federal and state commands, or of
inconsistency between various state regimes to which the same vessel may
be subject." 79 1 Such laws create a risk of disrupting uniformity and
impinging on the U.S. treaty obligation to recognize certificates issued by
other parties to those treaties. State regulations may also interfere with "the
accomplishment and execution of the full federal purposes and objectives of
Congress" and the President in the PWSA/PTSA and statutes and regulations implementing the SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW conventions to
pursue uniform international standards. The Court in Ray recognized that
state laws on tanker design and construction would "frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international standards." 792 Indeed, as the
House Merchant Marine & Fisheries Comm.) (Sept. 13, 1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3270.
3314-15.
786
Statement Accompanying Proclamation of Exclusive Economic Zone, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Docs. 383 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 461, 464 (1983):
The United States will continue to work through the International Maritime Organization and other

appropriate international organizations to develop uniform international measures for the protection
of the marine environment while imposing no unreasonable burdens on commercial shipping.
7
78 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 166, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
78
81d.
789S. Rep. No. 92-724, at 23 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2766 (emphasis added).
79°1d.;
see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 167 n.18.
t
79 Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 629, 1994 AMC 2705 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994)) (emphasis added).
192
Ray, 435 U.S. at 168.
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United States argued in the Intertanko appeal, discussed below, its representatives at the IMO will have little to bargain with in negotiating for
stricter international standards if the federal government cannot bind the
entire nation to the agreed-upon standards. 793 As one congressional representative observed in support of uniformity based on the internationally
agreed-upon standards, "the United States simply cannot urge the world
community to adopt tougher anti-pollution measures, get most of what it
wants through international agreement ....

and then return home and pass

unilaterally the few things it was unable to get at the international
conference.

' 794

2. The National Judgment to Pursue Comity and Reciprocity

International comity and reciprocity considerations enter into maritime
preemption analysis in two respects. First, international agreements and
federal legislation that incorporate comity or reciprocity provisions are
federal law, which may displace state law under the Supremacy Clause.
Second, state regulatory regimes that deny a foreign vessel the benefits of
reciprocity granted by the national government may embarrass the national
government and interfere with the nation's foreign relations policy.
"Comity with other nations and among the States was a primary aim of the
Constitution. At the time of the framing, it was essential that our prospective
trading partners would know that the United States would uphold its treaties,
respect the general maritime law, and refrain from erecting barriers from
commerce. '795 The IMO marine safety and pollution prevention conventions
are all quite clear in their reciprocity provisions: flag State compliance
certificates shall be accepted by all port States that are party to the
conventions, unless there are clear grounds for believing that the condition
of the ship or of her equipment does not correspond substantially with the
particulars of those certificates. 796 Those internationally recognized certificates now serve as evidence of compliance with merchant vessel construction, design, equipment, and manning (CDEM) requirements,, the vessel
safety management systems code, and the crew qualification, training, and
watchstanding standards. 797 Any state regulation or enforcement action that
denies a foreign vessel the benefits of reciprocal recognition of compliance
793

See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant U.S., Intertanko v. United States, supra Part I, note 2, at 23.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, supra Part I, note 612, pt. I at 79 (comments to Rep. Paul McCloskey).
795
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,466, 1994 AMC 913 (1994) (Kennedy & Thomas,
794

JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). By denying forum non conveniens as a defense in all maritime cases,
the state "upsets international and interstate comity and obstructs maritime trade." 510 U.S. at 463.
796
See supra Part 11, note 495 and accompanying text.
797
See supra Part II,
IV.C.
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with international standards may undermine the nation's foreign relations
and create the potential for a protest or even retaliation by the vessel's flag
State.
Consistent with the IMO conventions, Congress incorporated a number of
reciprocity provisions in Titles 33 (Navigable Waters) and 46 (Shipping) of
the U.S. Code. 798 Unfortunately, courts often fail to consider the purpose and
objective of such statutes in a maritime preemption analysis. Congress has
explicitly determined in those statutes that vessels which meet the standards
of the IMO-sponsored treaties to which the U.S. is party shall be exempt
from regulations promulgated under the PWSA, 799 and many other statutes. 800 The reciprocity statutes embody more than a federal judgment that
the international standards prescribed by the IMO conventions provide an
acceptable level of safety and marine environmental protection. The statutes
also seek to obtain reciprocal benefits for U.S. vessels in the ports and waters
of other nations. Any preemption analysis that overlooks the purposes and
objectives which animate comity and reciprocity provisions fails to accord
all federal law its appropriate status under Article VI.
3. The National Judgment to Promote Freedom of Navigation and
Reciprocal Port Access
At the same time that it confirmed to the states title to the submerged
lands and waters of the adjacent oceans out to three nautical miles, Congress,
in the Submerged Lands Act, reserved to the federal government the
"paramount" power to control and regulate the navigable waters of the U.S.
"for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense,
and international affairs. ' 80 1 Within its territorial sea, the United States
recognizes, as a matter of international law, a foreign vessel's right of
innocent passage and a right of transit passage through international
straits. 80 2 In return, the U.S. expects similar treatment for its vessels. As.a
matter of domestic law, federal merchant vessel safety and pollution
prevention statutes and regulations, with few exceptions, expressly exempt
79

8See supra note 781.

799

pWSA, supra Part 11,note 587, tit. II, § 5 ("The rules and regulations for vessel safety established
hereunder and the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to vessels of a foreign nation having on
board a valid certificate of inspection recognized under law or treaty by the United States") and § 7(d)
(extending reciprocity to foreign vessel certificates issued under authority of a treaty to which United
States is party).
8°°See supra note 781.
80' 4 3 U.S.C. § 1314. The regulatory power over the territorial sea is shared with the states. Barber v.
Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1191, 1995 AMC 1763 (9th Cir. 1994). State regulation is, however, subject to
preemption under Article VI, the Commerce Clause, or if in conflict with an international treaty. Id.
802See supra Part I, note 91 and accompanying text.
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vessels in innocent passage through the territorial sea or in transit through an
international strait. 80 3 The U.S. position is consistent with the limitations on
coastal State jurisdiction under the 1982 LOS Convention. 80 4 The national
judgment to exempt transiting vessels from U.S. laws serves the national
self-interest in preserving freedom of navigation. Not all states act consistently with the U.S. obligation under international law, however; creating
potentially serious foreign relations problems for the nation. The state of
Washington, for example, expressed its intent to apply its tanker laws to all
vessels in state waters-even those transiting to foreign ports.80 5 Similar
problems may arise if Alaska attempts to enforce state requirements on
vessels entitled to a right of transit passage through Unimak Pass on their
80 6
great circle route across the north Pacific Ocean.
In the PWSA, Congress determined that vessel safety and pollution
prevention in international boundary waters lying between the U.S. and
Canada and Mexico was best achieved by negotiating international agreements with the adjacent nations. 80 7 The President entered into such an
agreement with Canada for the northwest straits that form the western
boundary between the U.S. and Canada. 80 8 Pursuant to the grant of authority
by Congress, the Coast Guard may waive U.S. requirements for vessels
bound for Canada, if those vessels comply with Canadian requirements.
Notwithstanding the federal government's agreement with Canada, the state
of Washington has asserted that it will enforce its own requirements on
vessels bound for Canadian ports, essentially stripping Canada-bound
80 9
vessels of the reciprocity benefits of the international agreement.
0

8 3See, e.g., PTSA, supra Part 11, note 724, tit. I, § 5(d) ("Except pursuant to international treaty,
convention, or agreement, to which the United States is a party, this Act shall not apply to any foreign
vessel that is not destined for, or departing from, a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and that is in" innocent passage through the territorial sea of the United States or through the
navigable waters of the United States which form an international strait); 33 C.F.R. § 164.02 (exempting
foreign vessels in innocent passage or transit passage from Navigation Safety Regulations).
8°4LOS Convention, supra Part 11, note 384, art. 21. Providing that, with respect to foreign vessels in
innocent passage, the coastal State "laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international
rules or standards."
05
8 Letter from Barbara Herman, Administrator, Washington Office of Marine Safety, to RADM
James Card, U.S. Coast Guard, dated Apr. 19, 1995 ("All tank vessels operating in Washington waters,
including Canadian-bound vessels, are subject to [Washington] prevention plan requirements"). By
contrast, the Hawaii statute regulating vessel mooring in state waters that was analyzed by the Ninth
Circuit in Barber v. Hawaii expressly exempted vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and
was drafted to avoid any interference with the right of innocent passage. Barber, 42 F.3d at 1195-96.
0
8 6See LOS Convention, supra Part 11, note 384, arts. 38 & 42 (describing transit passage regime).
07
8 See supra Part II, 1 V.B.
8081d.
0

8 9See supra note 805.
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4. The Role of FederalAgency Judgments on Preemption
The President has directed all federal agencies to analyze the potential
federalism implications of any new agency regulations.8 10 An agency's
conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of a rule and any related federal
law may serve as a guide to state legislatures and administrative agencies in
developing consistent state rules. Federal agency decisions will be particularly important under circumstances where the enabling state statute requires
that the state agency's rules be implemented in a manner consistent with
federal law. 811 Under such circumstances, the responsible state agency may
look to the federal agency's federalism statements to ascertain the agency's
conclusions on any subjects that are preempted by federal law. 812 Additionally, the agency's federalism statements may provide guidance to the states
on the circumstances under which the federal government is likely to
challenge state regulations on preemption grounds.
Opinions by involved federal agencies can also provide invaluable
information to courts reviewing challenges to state regulations, particularly
when international treaties or foreign relations concerns are relevant. Some
commentators have even argued that federal agencies should be given
"primary jurisdiction" over preemption challenges.81 3 Federal agencies are
generally well informed on treaty and other international law developments
affecting subjects within their assigned responsibility. And federal agencies
may provide needed information on the relationship between federal and
state regulatory regimes and whether the state regime will interfere with the
full accomplishment of the federal legislation's purpose. 8 14 As discussed
0

81 Executive Order 12,612, 3 C.F.R. § 253 (1987). The agency's federalism assessment is published
in the Federal Register. The President directed that agencies should conclude that state authority is
preempted only "when the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm
and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or
when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the
Federal statute."
81'In enacting Washington's new tanker laws, for example, the state legislature required that the act
be implemented in a manner consistent with federal law to the maximum extent practicable. Wash. Rev.
Code 2 § 88.46.020.
81 Problems will arise, however, if agency opinions are either poorly reasoned or inconsistent. In the
Intertanko v. Locke litigation, one of the chief complaints was that the Coast Guard had not been
consistent in its position on preemption of the state's tanker laws. See Brief of Intervenors, Washington
Environmental Council, et al., at 21-23, Intertanko v. Locke, 1998 WL 547205 (9th Cir. 1998) (No.
97-35010).
8 3
" R. Findley & D. Farber, Environmental Law 85 (3d ed. 1992) ("the ability of an agency to issue
a preemptive regulation suggests that the courts should require all preemption issues to be presented
initially to the agencies, subject to ultimate judicial review").
14
8 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) ("Because the FDA is the federal agency
to which Congress has delegated its authority to implement the provisions of the Act, the agency is
uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
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earlier, one test of whether federal and state regulations may coexist is
whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal
superintendence of the field.8t 5 Congress has assigned to the Secretary of
Transportation responsibility for "general superintendence over the merchant marine of the United States." 81 6 Agency judgments on whether state
regulatory measures impair federal superintendence of the field will often be
the most reliable measure of any conflict.
Agency preemption statements are not merely precatory. The Supreme
Court has "held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal
regulations as well as by federal statutes." 8t 7 The agency's decision to
preempt state regulation is to be upheld unless it is clear that Congress would
not have sanctioned a preemption of state authority in the subject area
regulated by the agency. 81 8 An agency's preemption statement is "dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless either the agency's
position is inconsistent with expressed congressional intent . . . or subse-

quent developments reveal a change in that position." 8t 9 The Court concluded in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. that an agency determination not to

820
impose a regulation may also preempt state laws on the subject.
The Coast Guard has been selective in its determinations regarding the
preemptive effect of its regulations, other than those establishing construction, design, equipment, and manning (CDEM) requirements. In promulgating final rules designed to harmonize Coast Guard requirements for U.S.
vessels with international standards, the Coast Guard concluded that "vessel
design, construction, equipment, and manning standards fall within the
exclusive province of the Federal Government."'82' In its recent regulatory
project to provide alternative methods to fulfill design, inspection, and
certification requirements, 822 the agency concluded that the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,' and therefore should be
pre-empted").
815 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S 132, 142 (1963).
51646 U.S.C. § 2103. More specifically, 46 U.S.C. § 3703 charges the Secretary with superintendence
vessel CDEM, operation, and personnel qualification standards.
of tank
817 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citations omitted);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 735-37 (1949).
818Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982); see also Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 496-97 (holding that an agency's interpretation of the preemptive effect of its regulations is
entitled to deference where Congress has delegated authority to the agency, the agency's interpretation
is not19 contrary to a statute, and agency expertise is important to determining preemption).
8 Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 714-15 (citations omitted).
820435 U.S. 151, 171-72, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (federal agency's determination that no tug escort
requirement should be imposed would preempt a contrary requirement by the state) (dictum).
82162 Fed. Reg. 51,188, 51,190 (DOT 1997).
82261 Fed. Reg. 68,510 (DOT 1996).
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authority to regulate safety requirements of U.S. vessels is committed to the
Coast Guard by statute. Furthermore, since these vessels tend to move from
port to port in the national market place, these safety requirements .need to be
national in scope to avoid numerous, unreasonable and burdensome variances.
8 23
Therefore, this action will preempt State action addressing the same matter.
In implementing the new ISM Code, the Coast Guard concluded that state
regulations that seek to impose different or higher standards than those
established by federal regulations are preempted.8 24 Similarly, after concluding that no additional structural measures to reduce oil spills from existing
tank vessels without double hulls are presently justified, the Coast Guard
determined that the states were preempted from establishing any additional
requirements. 825 The Coast Guard also stated its intent to preempt state
standards concerning oil spill prevention and response equipment for
826
vessels.
By contrast, in promulgating regulations establishing requirements for
escort tugs in Prince William Sound, the Coast Guard concluded that more
stringent state requirements were not preempted, unless the state regulations
directly conflicted with the Coast Guard's regulations. 827 Similarly, in
promulgating regulations for vessel response plans, the Coast Guard
concluded that state requirements were not preempted, unless it would be
impossible to comply with both the federal and state requirements. 828
C. When State Judgments Conflict with Internationalor FederalStandards
Federalism disputes over merchant vessel regulation are most likely to
arise when the state denies entry to a commercial vessel that holds all of the
federally-required licenses and inspection certificates to operate in U.S.
waters or admits the vessel only if it complies with additional state
requirements. The Supreme Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. held that
the "Supremacy Clause dictates that a federal judgment that a vessel is safe
823

1d. at 68,517.
82462 Fed. Reg. 67,492, 67,506 (DOT 1997).
82562 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1625-26 (DOT 1997) ("The Coast Guard believes the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress is to confer upon the Federal government, through the Coast Guard, the exclusive
authority to set structural standards for vessels to protect the environment from harm. The Coast Guard
has determined that no additional structural measures are required for single-hull tank vessels.
Nevertheless, the Coast Guard believes that States are precluded from imposing structural measures on
tank vessels operating in interstate or foreign commerce.").
82658 Fed. Reg. 67,988, 67,995 (DOT 1993). Whether a state law saving clause similar to § 1018 of
OPA 90 "saved" the state's authority to impose oil spill containment equipment requirements on vessels
was left open by the Supreme Court in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,
336-37, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
82759 Fed. Reg. 42,968 (DOT 1994).
82858 Fed. Reg. 7376, 7421 (DOT 1993); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 1052, 1080 (DOT 1996).
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to navigate United States waters prevails over the contrary state judgment. '82 9 At the same time, however, holding a federal license or inspection
certificate does not completely immunize a vessel from state regulation. The
Court has upheld the states' application of reasonable, non-discriminatory
"conservation and environmental protection measures" to federally licensed
vessels. 830 In reconciling these holdings, the Court in Ray noted that in none
of the cases upholding state conservation and environmental protection
83 1
measures did the state law address the same object as federal law.
Notwithstanding the "no overlap" rule, states continue to impose safety and
pollution prevention requirements on vessels operating in state waters even
though the state regulations address the same object as the treaties, federal
statutes, and federal regulations that make up federal law. States enforce
those requirements through a variety of sanctions, including banishment
from state waters. Three federal cases-drawn from Alaska, Washington,
and New York-demonstrate the extent to which some states seek to
regulate, even bar, maritime operations in state waters.
1. Chevron v. Hammond: Ninth Circuit Upholds an Alaska Ban on
Ballast Water Discharges that are Permitted by Federal Law
In 1976, the Alaska legislature enacted a comprehensive tanker act to
address the state's concerns over the transport risks associated with the
opening of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 832 The Act required oil tankers
operating in state waters to obtain a "risk avoidance certificate" from the
state and prohibited the discharge of any ballast water from a vessel's cargo
tanks. 833 Tankers operating in state waters were required to pay a "risk
charge" to the state's Coastal Protection Fund. The amount of the charge
depended in part on the vessel's construction and equipment. Vessels not
fitted with state-specified navigation and collision avoidance equipment or a
bow-thruster paid higher risk charges. 834 By characterizing the construction
and equipment standards as a "risk factor," rather than a direct regulation of
vessel construction and equipment, the state hoped to avoid what it
835
acknowledged was a serious threat of preemption.
The United States joined several tanker owners in challenging the state
law on preemption grounds. While the preemption challenge was pending in
829 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
830
1d. at 164 (citations omitted).
8311d. (citations omitted).
8321976 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 266.
833
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 1978 AMC 1697, 1699 (D. Alaska 1978).
83

41d

835See .id. at 1705 (statement of the Alaska Attorney General).
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the district court, Alaska conceded that the navigation equipment requirements of the Act were preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, as
construed by the Supreme Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.8 36 In
reviewing the remaining provisions of the Alaska act, the district court first
pointed out that the state had failed "to distinguish the complete federal
preemption provided by Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act from
the limited federal preemption of Title I. '' 837 Under the Supreme Court's
decision in Ray, said the district court, Title II of the PWSA completely
occupies the field of vessel design. 838 Moreover, differing state regulations
would frustrate the object of.Title 11.839 By contrast, Title I does not
completely occupy the field. The district court held that the Alaska risk
charge scheme fell within the subject regulated by Title II of the PWSA, and
840
was therefore completely preempted.
The district court reviewed the Alaska ballast water regulations for tank
ships in a separate decision. 8 4' Under authority of the PTSA, the Coast
Guard had already established effluent standards for the discharge of ballast
water from tank ships. 842 The federal standards, which adopted the ballasting
standards prescribed by Annex I of the MARPOL Convention, permitted
tankers to discharge "clean ballast" water. 843 Rejecting the federal government's judgment, Alaska's legislation completely prohibited the discharge
of ballast water from a tanker's cargo tanks, even if the ballast water met the
federal definition of "clean ballast."8' 44 The district court held that the state's
ban on ballast water discharges was preempted by the Coast Guard
regulation issued under authority of Title II of the PWSA. 845 On appeal, the
United States again joined the challengers in arguing that the Alaska law was
...
1d. at 1701.
37

8 1d. at 1713.
81d. at 1714.

. 39 Id. at 1713.
"OId. at 1714.

84'The district court's decision on the ballast water discharge ban is not reported.
84246 U.S.C. § 391a(6)(a)(vii) (Supp. V 1981) [now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(7)]; 33 C.F.R.
§ 157.43 (1982) (exempting from its discharge prohibition the discharge of "clean ballast").
84333 C.F.R. § 157.43(a) (1982). 33 C.F.R. § 157.03 defines "clean ballast" water as ballast which:
(1) If discharged from a vessel that is stationary into clean, calm water on a clear day, would
not(i) produce visible traces of oil on the surface of the water or on adjoining shore lines; or
(ii) cause a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon
adjoining shore lines; or
(2) If verified by an approved cargo monitor and control system, has an oil content that does not
exceed [now 15 parts per million].
The Coast Guard definition of "clean ballast" is identical in all relevant respects to the definition in
the MARPOL regulations. See MARPOL, supra Part II, note 388, Annex I, reg. 9(4).
844Alaska Stat. § 46.03.750(e) (1976).
84533 C.F.R. §§ 157.29, 157.37(a)(1) (1982).
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preempted. 846 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, upholding the
state rule. 847 Four aspects of the circuit court's decision merit examination.
First, the court characterized the Alaska tanker ballast statute as strictly a
pollutant discharge regulation, despite the statute's effect on tanker operations. Second, the court relied heavily on a Clean Water Act (CWA) state
law saving provision to support its conclusion that the Alaska law was not
preempted by the PWSA. Third, the court appeared to give no weight to the
Executive Branch's conclusion that state ballast water regulations were
preempted by the federal regulations. Finally, the court's conclusion that the
federal government has little or no interest in regulatory uniformity or in
aligning domestic laws with its treaty obligations merits examination,
particularly because the Ninth Circuit's Hammond decision continues to be
cited within the circuit in support of a view that international agreements set
only "minimum standards," which the states are free to exceed.

a. Characterizingthe Subject Matter
The Ninth Circuit began its "occupation of the field" analysis by
acknowledging the importance of the subject matter of the federal and state
regulations under examination. 848 Indeed, it will be seen that the court's
single-purpose characterization of the Alaska statute's subject matter largely
determined the outcome of the case. The Alaska statute challenged in
Hammond:
1. Prohibited the carriage of oil cargo in a tanker's segregated ballast tanks;
2. Prohibited tankers fitted with segregated ballast tanks from carrying
ballast water in the vessel's cargo tanks, except in an emergency, and only then
with the permission of the relevant state regulatory agency;
3. Prohibited the discharge of ballast water from a tanker's cargo tanks in
state waters; and,
4. Required that all ballast water carried in a tanker's cargo tanks be
849
processed by or in an onshore ballast water treatment facility.
846

See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140 (1984) (No. 84-634), in which the Solicitor General wrote:
The United States participated as amicus curiae in the district court and the court of appeals to urge
that the deballasting prohibition contained in Alaska Stat. § 46.03.750(e) (Supp. 1977) is preempted
by regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I1 of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972
(PWSA), 46 U.S.C. § 391a, as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (PTSA)....
47
8 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied
sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
8481d. at 487-88.
849AIaska Stat. § 46.03.750(e) (1976) (as quoted in 726 F.2d at 485 n.1).
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In characterizing the Alaska statute, the court chose to classify it as a
regulation of "ocean pollutant discharges." 850 The immediate problem with
the court's classification of the Alaska statute is that it was not drafted as a
85 1
pollutant discharge prohibition. As drafted at the time of the challenge,
the statute prescribed where a tanker may and may not carry ballast water,
a subject regulated by MARPOL and federal regulations. 852 The court did
853
not address this aspect of the Alaska statute in its preemption analysis.
The statute also requires that all ballast water carried in a tank ship's cargo
854
tanks be "processed by or in an onshore ballast water treatment facility,"
and forbids the discharge of ballast water from a tanker's cargo tanks in state
waters. Because the statute is framed in the conjunctive, the shore-side
processing requirement could be construed by state regulators as precluding
Alaska-bound tank vessels from discharging clean ballast water immediately
before arriving in state waters. The court did not examine whether this
created a conflict with the federal rule or with MARPOL Annex 1,855 which
governs discharges beyond U.S. waters. Even more problematic for the
court's characterization is the fact that the "no discharge" rule in the Alaska
statute is not based on the presence or concentration of pollutants in the
vessel's ballast water. The statute prohibits the discharge of ballast water
from a cargo tank even if the water is completely free of oil and any other
pollutant. 856 This aspect of the Alaska statute renders the circuit court's
classification of the deballasting ban solely as an "ocean pollutant dis850726 F.2d at 488. By contrast, the Coast Guard's regulation for tanker de-ballasting is codified in
the "vessel operation" subpart of its rules for oil tankers. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 157, subpart C (1982).
851The statute was amended in 1980. See 726 F.2d at 499 n.21. The court's analysis focused on the
pre-1980
version of the statute.
852See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 157.35 (prescribing conditions under which ballast water may be carried in
cargo tanks); MARPOL, Annex I, reg. 13 (prescribing conditions under which ballast water may be
carried in cargo tanks). The MARPOL Convention of 1973 became effective through its 1978 Protocol
on October 2, 1983. The Hammond opinion creates the impression, however, that the MARPOL
convention was not in force at the time the decision was issued, on February 3, 1984. See 726 F.2d at
494 n.14.
853The court's holding is limited to the state's ban on ballast water discharges in state waters. See 726
F.2d 54at 501.
8 Alaska Stat. § 46.03.750(e) (1976) (quoted in 726 F.2d at 485 n.1).
855U.S. implementing legislation was enacted on October 21, 1980. See Act to Prevent Pollution From
Ships (APPS), Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2297 (1980) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911). The
legislative history, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4849, provides an informative history of MARPOL
73/78 and its implementation in the U.S. The Ninth Circuit did not examine the APPS in its preemption
analysis. Any contemporary preemption analysis under APPS would have to consider the effect of the
Act's 1987 amendments implementing MARPOL Annex V, particularly § 2003(b) of the Act, which
saves state authority to impose additional requirements. See Marine Plastic Pollution Research and
Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-220, title II, § 2003, 101 Stat. 1460 (1987).
S56Admittedly, ballast water discharged from a cargo tank will almost certainly contain some residual
oil, even if it is first processed through the vessel's oily-water separator. See generally G. Marton, Tanker
Operations: A Handbook for the Ship's Officer ch. 7 (3d ed. 1992).
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charges" rule questionable. 857 A thorough analysis might have also classified
the Alaska statute as a regulation of vessel operations, with potentially
far-reaching implications for tank vessel design. 858 Had the court in
Hammond begun with such a characterization, and considered all of the
objectives in the federal "vessel operation" rule, it might have reached a
different conclusion on the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Ray,
whether Title II of the PWSA/PTSA occupied the field, and whether the
Alaska statute frustrated one or more of the federal purposes in the vessel
ballasting regulations.
b. The Switch: DistinguishingRay v. Atlantic Richfield Co. by Shifting to
a CWA Analysis
In Title II of the PWSA, 859 and later in the PTSA, 860 Congress directed the
Coast Guard to prescribe regulations to reduce or eliminate oil discharges
during ballasting and deballasting of tank vessels. 861 As with all Title II
requirements, the Coast Guard is directed to consult with the affected states
in developing the regulations.8 62 The only saving provision for state laws in
the PWSA/PTSA applies to safety standards for facilities. 863 Nothing in the
PWSA or the PTSA saves state authority to regulate tanker ballasting. The
Supreme Court held in Ray that Title II of the PWSA/PTSA completely
occupied the field of tanker design and construction. It will be recalled,
however, that Title II requires the Coast Guard to promulgate regulations
that go beyond tanker design and construction. Title II also directs the
agency to prescribe regulations for, inter alia, tanker operations, equipment,
personnel qualification and training, manning standards, the handling and
stowage of cargo, and tanker ballasting and deballasting. 864 The Supreme
Court in Ray found it unnecessary in that case to examine the extent to which
8571t will be seen that in its 1998 decision in the Intertanko case, the circuit court characterizes the
Alaska statute as an "operations" rule. See infra note 961.
858Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1142 n.3, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari) (noting that "[d]esign specifications and operating
procedures are in many respects inextricably linked, and this linkage is striking where ballasting-the
subject
of the regulations at issue in this case-is concerned").
859 PWSA, supra Part II, note 587, § 201(7).
0
86 PTSA, supra Part II, note 613, § 5 (amending former 46 U.S.C. § 391a(6)(A)(vii)).
861At the time of the Hammond decision, the statutory requirement for the Coast Guard to promulgate
rules for "the reduction or elimination of discharges during ballasting, deballasting, tank cleaning [and]
cargo handling" was codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391a. When Title 46 was re-codified and enacted into
positive law the provision was re-codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(7).
62

. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(b).
863See supra Part 11, note 633 and accompanying text.

864The requirement is presently codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a).
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Title II occupied the field for the rest of the subjects for which the Coast
865
Guard was directed to prescribe regulations.
Having characterized the Alaska statute as an oil pollution regulation, the
Ninth Circuit in Hammond framed the issue on appeal as whether Congress
in passing the PTSA/PWSA implicitly intended to occupy the field of
"regulating pollution from oil tankers within a state's territorial waters. 866
The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Ray regarding the
extent to which Title II of the PWSA occupied the field did not extend
beyond tanker design requirements, but it did not attempt to apply the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Ray (the statutory pattern in Title II, the fact
that the Secretary was required to prescribe regulations) to the ballasting
regulation at issue in Hammond. The court instead recalled that Ray
"specifically explained that tankers must meet 'otherwise valid state or
federal rules of regulation that do not constitute design or construction
specifications.' 867 For reasons not explained in the opinion, the court failed
to mention the closely-related passage in Ray, in which the Supreme Court
limited the passage quoted by the Ninth Circuit above by explaining that:
[I]n none of the relevant cases sustaining the application of state laws to
federally licensed or inspected vessels did the federal licensing or inspection
procedure implement a substantive rule of federal law addressed
to the object
also sought to be achieved by the challenged state regulation.8 68
It will be readily seen that the Alaska ballast water discharge ban in
Hammond and the statute's prescriptions on where tankers may legally carry
ballast water were addressed to the same object as the federal rule and the
MARPOL Convention. For that reason, the Alaska statute is readily
distinguishable from the air emission ordinance upheld by the Supreme
Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit.869 At the time Huron was

decided, no federal law or regulation controlled air pollution from vessels.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court found "no overlap" between the scope of
the federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordinance.8 70 By
contrast, the Alaska regulation challenged in Hammond prohibited tanker
8651n reaching its conclusion that Title II occupied the field of tanker design the Supreme Court
reasoned that:
This statutory pattern shows that Congress, insofar as design characteristics are concerned, has
entrusted to the Secretary the duty of determining which oil tankers are sufficiently safe to be
allowed to proceed in the navigable waters of the United States.
Ray,66435 U.S. at 163. The statutory pattern is the same for the other subjects covered in Title II.
8 Hammond, 726 F.2d at 486.
67
1 1d. at 487 (citing Ray, 435 U.S. at 168-69).
868Ray, 435 U.S. at 164.
869362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
8701d. at 446.
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deballasting operations that the federal regulations (and MARPOL) permitted. Despite the critical difference between the Alaska ballast water law and
the state laws that the Supreme Court had earlier upheld in cases such as
Huron, and Ray's explicit reference to the absence of "overlap" in
explaining its earlier decisions, the circuit court in Hammond concluded that
Ray did not control the outcome of the case. 87 1 The court did not analyze
whether the MARPOL Convention or the U.S. implementing regulations
occupied the broader field of tanker ballasting, the relationship between the
design and layout of cargo tanks, segregated ballast tanks and dedicated
clean ballast tanks, and the circumstances under which ballast water and/or
oil could be carried in those tanks.
In reasoning that at least one justice of the Supreme Court later found
unusual,87 2 the Ninth Circuit in Hammond elected to focus much of its
analysis on the federal CWA, a cooperative federalism regime, to determine
whether Congress intended to occupy the field of pollution by tankers
caused by deballasting in state waters. 87 3 The court sought to reconcile its
reliance on the CWA with the Supreme Court's rejection of that very
argument in Ray8 7 4 by again distinguishing the "subject matter" of the
Alaska statute. 875 The court also explained that the need to look "at the entire
federal statutory scheme relative to a particular subject matter" animated the

court's decision to turn to the CWA. 876 The court then focused on the CWA
provisions establishing the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) and its related state law saving clause. That saving clause provides
that "nothing in this chapter" [chapter 26 of Title 33 of the U.S. Code] shall
preclude or deny the right of any state or political subdivision to adopt or
enforce any standard or limitation respecting the discharge of pollutants or
81'726 F.2d at 487. Oddly, the same court later described its opinion in Hammond as one that relied
"heavily"
on Ray. See Beveridge v. Lewis. 939 F.2d 859, 863, 1992 AMC 130 (9th Cir. 1991).
872See infra note 883 and accompanying text.
873The court mentioned, but did not analyze, the 1990 APPS, even though that Act expressly regulates
oil discharges from vessels and assigns authority to implement MARPOL to the Secretary of the
department
in which the Coast Guard is operating. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1903 & 1907.
874Ray, 435 U.S. at 178 n.28 (rejecting the state's reliance on the FWPCA, CZMA, and Deepwater
Port Act).
8"5726 F.2d at 491 n.10 (explaining that "[tihe Ray footnote [rejecting the state's reliance on the
FWPCA] does not control this case for the same reason that Ray's holding does not control this
case-Ray is specifically and narrowly confined to a different subject"). For reasons the Ninth Circuit
never explained, the court found it unnecessary to its judicial review to apply the reasoning in Ray to the
remaining subjects addressed by Title II, to determine whether Congress intended to occupy the field for
each76of the subjects now listed in 46 U.S.C. § 3703.
8 1d. A truly comprehensive review of the relevant federal law would have considered the MARPOL
Convention and Protocol, APPS, the PWSA and PTSA, the Coast Guard's implementing regulations, and
the agency's conclusions regarding the extent to which state regulations on the same subject were
preempted.
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any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution.877 Although
by its terms the CWA saving provision has no bearing on preemption of state
law by any federal law other than the CWA, the court found that it was
relevant to Congress' preemptive intent under the PWSA/PTSA. 878 After
observing that states were free to establish more stringent water quality
standards under the CWA, and concluding that the CWA's NPDES provisions "converted" the Alaska ballasting law into a "federal CWA standard," 879 the court held that Alaska was not preempted from enacting tanker
ballast water discharge standards that were stricter than those promulgated
880
by the Coast Guard.
The Supreme Court denied the challengers' petition for certiorari over
Justice White's dissent.8 81 Justice White criticized the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the CWA. 882 He observed that the CWA "sheds little or no light
on the question whether protection of the marine environment against the
threats posed specifically by oil tanker traffic is, under Title II of the PWSA,
a matter in which federal regulation has displaced state control." 883 He
singled out the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the NPDES provisions in the
CWA for particular criticism, after noting that the federal regulations
implementing the NPDES program expressly exempt discharges from
vessels incident to their normal operation. 884 It should also be noted that the
CWA authority to regulate point source discharges does not carry with it the
authority to regulate the point source itself.885 Thus, even if the NPDES

...
33 U.S.C. § 1370. The Ninth Circuit cited Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973), in its decision in Hammond, and noted that the statute at issue in-Askew
had express non-preemption language [now 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2)]. However, the Hammond court did
not rely on the § 1321(o)(2) saving clause in the CWA to "save" the state's regulation of ballast water
discharges. See Hammond, 726 F.2d at 488 n.6 & 490-91 n.9.
878The court sought to bolster its CWA reasoning by referring to sections of the Oil Pollution Act
Amendments of 1973 (OPAA), an act which the court acknowledged was superseded by APPS before
it ever became effective. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 494 n. 14. The court did not explain why it did not rely
instead on the APPS, the act that superseded the OPAA.
179726 F.2d at 490. One problem with the court's conclusion is that the federal CWA regulations
expressly exempt vessels discharges incident to normal operations of the vessel. See 40 C.F.R. §
110.5(a).
80726 F.2d at 489-90.
881Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
8821d. at 1143.
883Id.

8841d. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a)). Vessels are included within the statutory definition of a "point
source." See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). However, vessels are exempt from the NPDES permit requirement.
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a). In a related provision, any discharge of oil permitted under MARPOL 73/78,
Annex I, as provided by 33 C.F.R. pt. 151, is not a discharge of oil in a quantity which may be harmful.
See 40 C.F.R. § 110.5(a) & (b).
885Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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regime applied to vessels, nothing in the regime would authorize a state (or
the EPA) to regulate a tank vessel's internal ballasting operations.
c. Effect Given to the Executive Branch's Preemption Judgment
The Coast Guard, acting through the Department of Justice, joined the
challengers in arguing that federal law preempted the Alaska ballast water
discharge ban. 886 The Ninth Circuit opinion paid only passing attention to
the relevance of the agency's intent to preempt state laws on tanker
ballasting, even though the Supreme Court has held that an agency's
preemption judgment is "dispositive on the question of implicit intent to
pre-empt unless either the agency's position is inconsistent with expressed
congressional intent ... or subsequent developments reveal a change in that
887
position."
The Coast Guard was required by Title II of the PWSA/PTSA to prescribe
ballasting regulations. The Supreme Court in Ray had already recognized
that other provisions of Title II occupied the field of tanker design
requirements. The Act to Prevent Pollution by Ships (APPS) delegated to the
Coast Guard authority to implement the MARPOL 1978 Protocol. 8 88 The
Coast Guard regulation permitting tankers to discharge clean ballast was
identical to the MARPOL Annex I standard. Neither the PWSAIPTSA nor
APPS contains saving provisions for state laws regulating tanker ballasting.
The only source of congressional intent the Ninth Circuit identified that, in
the court's opinion, demonstrated the Coast Guard's intent to preempt state
regulations was "inconsistent with expressed congressional intent" came
from the NPDES provisions of the CWA, which do not apply to vessel
discharges incident to normal operations, and the 1973 Oil Pollution Act
Amendments, which were superseded even before they became effective.
Neither provides persuasive evidence that the Coast Guard's judgment was
inconsistent with expressed congressional intent. On the other hand, the
886 See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140 (1984) (No. 84-634), in which the Solicitor General wrote:
It has been the position of the United States throughout this litigation that the PWSA and the PTSA
systematically regulate pollution from tanker operations and that the interest in a nationally uniform
approach to the problem of oil pollution from vessels leaves no room for varying state regulations.
887 Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707. 714-15 (1985) (citations
omitted); Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (holding that an
agency's decision to preempt state regulation is to be upheld unless it is clear that Congress would not
have sanctioned a preemption of state authority in the subject area regulated by the agency). The Ninth
Circuit sought to avoid the Fidelity rule by noting that the Coast Guard "did not make any specific
findings that as to Alaska waters such a prohibition would seriously affect vital concerns for the safety
of vessels or the environment." Hammond, 726 F.2d at 498 n.19. The court cited no authority for
imposing a requirement so plainly at odds with the rule in Fidelity and Hillsborough.
...
See 33 U.S.C. § 1903(b).
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Coast Guard had not made clear its intent to preempt state regulation of
tanker ballasting operations at the time it promulgated its rule.8 89 Perhaps
that is one reason why Justice Stevens suggested, in explaining the Court's
denial of the petition for certiorari in Hammond, that "the Coast Guard
8' 90
retains the power to modify its regulations relating to deballasting.
d. Downplaying InternationalLaw and Uniformity
Perhaps the most troubling aspects of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Hammond, at least for maritime and international law practitioners and
scholars, is its conclusion that international agreements set only "minimum
standards,"891 and that states within the U.S. are therefore free to impose
stricter requirements. The court misunderstood the Article VI analysis for
treaties and underestimated the commitment of Congress and the President
to uniform international standards for merchant vessel safety and vesselsource pollution prevention.8 92 Moreover, the court's decision fails to
appreciate the difference between the national government excepting to
specific provisions of a treaty, as a foreign affairs policy choice, and state
governments enacting laws that conflict with a treaty to which the national
government has agreed to be bound.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because Congress required the Coast
Guard to promulgate regulations, while permitting those regulations to
exceed international standards, Congress must have the "view that the
international agreements set only minimum standards, that strict international uniformity was unnecessary, and that standards stricter than the
international minimums could be desirable in waters subject to federal
jurisdiction."8' 93 Even if the court was correct in its assessment of congres-

889See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718 ("because agencies normally address problems in a detailed
manner and can speak through a variety of means, including regulations, preambles, interpretive
statements, and responses to comments, we can expect that they will make their intentions clear if they
intend for their regulations to be exclusive").
90
8 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
respecting
the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
t
89 Hammond, 726 F.2d at 493 (concluding that, because Congress authorized the Coast Guard to
establish standards stricter than those established by international agreements, "This indicates Congress'
view that the international agreements set only minimum standards, that strict international uniformity
was unnecessary, and that standards stricter than the international minimums could be desirable in waters
subject to federal jurisdiction").
92
8 The same cannot be said of the U.S. attitude toward international conventions on liability, as
demonstrated by the nation's rejection of the CLC and Fund Conventions on oil pollution liability. See
supra Part 11, note 415.
89'726 F.2d at 493. The court also characterizes the national government as being constrained by
international law when acting beyond its territorial sea, but a sovereign within it. Id. at 497 n.17. While
correct as far as it goes, the court overlooks the fact that the U.S. may, by treaty, agree to restrict its
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sional intent, it does not follow that Congress' decision to forgo international
uniformity (and, presumably, to require the President to make appropriate
exceptions or reservations to the relevant treaties or conventions, as a
condition of giving its advice and consent) 894 left the states free to enact state
and local laws that varied from international standards set by treaties to
which the U.S. had agreed. By virtue of the supremacy of federal law "no
895
state can add to or take from the force and effect of [a] treaty."
The "conflict" prong of the Hammond analysis rests almost exclusively on
the court's analytic shift away from MARPOL, APPS, PWSA/PTSA, and
the Coast Guard's implementing regulations, to the NPDES provisions
under the CWA. 896 Even if the CWA was relevant to tanker ballast water
discharges, the court would still need to consider in its conflict analysis the
relationship between the CWA's saving clause for international law 897 and
the MARPOL Annex I clean ballast provisions. The court must also weigh
the importance of the fact that Congress excluded certain vessel discharges
permitted by MARPOL from the CWA discharge prohibition, 89 8 and that
APPS extends the application of MARPOL Annex I to both U.S. and foreign
vessels located in the navigable waters of the U.S.899 Finally, by focusing on
only one purpose-marine pollution prevention-while ignoring other
important interests the national government may be seeking to protect
through international agreement, the court skewed the conflict analysis.
Under the test in Ray, state law that stands as an "obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress" is superseded. 900 Any international or congressional rule or
standard reflects a balance between safety and environmental protection, on
the one hand, and feasibility, cost of compliance, the need for reciprocity,
and the desire to facilitate commerce on the other. A complete conflict
analysis must weigh each of these purposes.
In the end, the court' s decision in Hammond is undermined by its selective
search for evidence of congressional and presidential intent on the need for
actions within its own territory or territorial sea, and that those international agreements bind the entire
nation.
89 4See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra Part I, note 67, at 180-84 (describing circumstances under
which the Senate may impose conditions on its consent).
895Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); see also Restatement, supra Part I, note 19, § Il 1.
196726 F.2d at 496.
89 7Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 511(3), 86 Stat. 893 (1972), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3) (providing
that this chapter (33 U.S.C. ch. 26) shall not be construed as "affecting or impairing the provisions of any
treaty of the United States").
89833 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(3)(A). The exception for MARPOL discharges is applicable only in the waters
seaward of the territorial sea, but nevertheless is evidence that Congress subordinated the strict ban on
discharges under the CWA to the goal of conformity to MARPOL.
89933 U.S.C. § 1902(a).
900435 U.S. at 158 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67) (emphasis added).
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national uniformity and consistency with international standards. The
opinion examines only the isolated evidence of intent that supported
the judgment; it does not evaluate the contrary evidence. Evidence of the
Congress' and President's commitment to pursuing uniform international
standards and regulations for merchant vessel safety and vessel source
pollution prevention was abundant at the time of the Hammond decision, 90 1
just as it is under the later 1990 OPA. 90 2 In concluding that the PWSA
evinced an intent that the "Nation was to speak with one voice with respect
to tanker-design standards," 903 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Act's legislative history revealed a "decided congressional preference for
arriving at international standards for building tank vessels." 9°4 The Supreme Court in Ray rejected the state's argument that because Title II of the
Act purported only to establish "minimum" standards, the states were free to
enact more stringent requirements, 905 and held that a state law on the same
subject would "frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform,
international standards." 90 6 The Senate Report cited by the Court concluded
that "multilateral action with respect to comprehensive standard for the
design, construction, maintenance and operation of tankers for the protection of the marine environmental would be far preferable to unilateral
imposition of standards. '90 7 The foreign relations concerns of the Departments of State and Transportation over any decision to pursue unilateral
90 8
action against foreign vessels were described earlier.
e. Is Hammond Still Relevant?

. On its facts, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hammond has become largely
irrelevant. Older vessels that were built without dedicated ballast tanks were
being phased out even as the Ninth Circuit decided the Hammond case. As
Justice Stevens pointed out in explaining why the Supreme Court denied the
9°lSee supra Part H,
V.C.2 (describing presidential and congressional statements supporting
international standards in the context of the PTSA). To be sure, the national government has not become
a party to all of the conventions sponsored by the IMO (often rejecting conventions on liability), and it
has entered exceptions or reservations to some of the conventions it did ratify. But these exceptions do
not diminish the nation's commitment to an international approach to vessel safety and pollution
prevention.
90
2See, e.g., OPA 90 §§ 4106(b)(2) (provisions for reporting marine casualties are to be implemented
"to the extent consistent with generally recognized principles of international law"), 4106(a), 4109 &
4110(b).
3
9 Ray, 435 U.S. at 166.
9
041d.
905

1d. n.19.
9661d. at 168.
90'S. Rep. No. 92-725, at 23 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.c.A.N. 2766 (emphasis added).
9
°8See supra note 790; see also Ray, 435 U.S. at 167 n.18.
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petition for a writ of certiorari in the case, only one ship involved in the
Alaska trade would be affected by the Alaska statute, and no other state had
adopted similar laws. 90 9 Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned over
the opinion's sweeping language regarding the legal status of standards set
by international agreements, as the court's 1998 decision in the Intertanko
case demonstrates. The suggestion that the IMO conventions set only
minimum standards, which individual states within the U.S. are free to
exceed if their judgment is different than the national government's,
threatens the status of those international treaties as Law of the Land. Such
a suggestion would almost certainly come as a shock to other nations'
delegates at the IMO.
It is difficult to identify a principled distinction between the district
court's reasoning that the Coast Guard regulations prescribed under Title II
of the PWSA preempted the state regulation and the circuit's court judgment
that the answer was to be found instead in the CWA. Certainly the CWA is
where a court would look for a rationale to uphold the state rule if the judges
believed, as the panel in Hammond apparently did, that "the local community is more likely competent than the federal government to tailor
environmental regulations to the ecological sensitivities of a particular
area." 910 Despite its waning relevance to concerns over oil discharges,
Hammond may attract renewed interest as states legislate to combat
vessel-source air emissions and aquatic invasive species. In 1997, the
International Conference on Air Pollution Prevention adopted a new Annex
VI to MARPOL, which, when ratified by a sufficient number of members,
will prescribe international standards for vessel air emissions. 9t ' Delegates
from the U.S. and other IMO-member nations on the Marine Environment
Protection Committee are presently developing a draft Annex VII to
91 2
MARPOL, to address the spread of aquatic pests through ballast water.
Should the U.S. ratify either Annex, the relationship between the international standards agreed to by the federal government and potentially stricter
state standards would almost certainly resurface as a preemption issue.

909

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of petition for writ of certiorari). In its brief as amicus curiae, the United States argued against the
Court granting certiorari to the Ninth Circuit in the case for the same reason, among others. See Brief of
United States as Amicus Curiae, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, supra note 846, at 6.
910726 F.2d at 493. It should be noted that the Alaska ballasting rule did not apply to a "particular
area," but to all of the waters of the state. Alaska boasts 47,000 miles of coastline, more than the lower
48 states combined. See <http://www.state.ak.us/local/akfacts.htm#geography>.
9
11See IMO Briefing at <http://www.imo.org/imo/briefing/1997/faxl797.htm>.
2
91 See Marine Environment Protection Committee 41st Session, 30 Mar.-3 Apr. 1998, IMO News
2/98 (1998).
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2. Intertanko v. Locke 9 13: Ninth Circuit Upholds State Agency's Tanker
Regulations that are Stricter than Internationaland FederalStandards
Following its 1984 decision upholding the Alaska ballasting statute in
Hammond, the Ninth Circuit had four more occasions to consider preemption challenges to state or local government maritime regulations. 914 In each
of the first three cases, the court upheld the state regulations in full.
Intertanko v. Locke,9 15 the court's most recent decision, involved what is
arguably the most comprehensive state regulatory regime yet imposed on
merchant vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce on the
navigable waters of the U.S.
In 1991, two years after the Exxon Valdez disaster, and shortly after
passage of the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90),916 Washington
enacted the Oil and Hazardous Substances Spill Prevention and Response
Act. 9 17 The Act created a new state agency, the Office of Marine Safety
(OMS), 91 8 to implement and enforce the Act, and imposed a five cent/barrel
tax on oil imports by tank ship or barge to fund the state's prevention and
response program. 91 9 Operators of tank vessels transporting oil in Washington waters 920 are required by the Act to file with the state an oil-spill
prevention plan that complies with the "Best Achievable Protection" (BAP)
regulations promulgated by the OMS. 92 I The Act requires that any regula913

0n June 18, 1998, shortly after Part I of this article was finalized for publication, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals issued its decision in the Intertanko v. Locke case. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d

1053, 1998 AMC 2113 (9th Cir. 1998). Following a request for a rehearing en banc, the original panel
amended its decision on August 31, 1998. See 1998 WL 547205 (9th Cir. 1998).
914
See Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1991 AMC 2797 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding application of state overtime pay law to seamen not involved in foreign, intercoastal, or
coastwise trade while employed in territorial sea and on high seas adjacent to California), cert. denied sub
nom. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc. v. Aubrey, 504 U.S. 979 (1992); Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859,
1992 AMC 130 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding Santa Barbara municipal ordinance governing anchoring,
mooring, and movement of vessels); Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1995 AMC 1763 (9th Cir. 1994)
(upholding state regulation of vessel mooring and anchoring).
915International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, 1998 WL 547205 (9th Cir.
1998). For clarity, the district court's decision will be referred to as Intertanko 1, the circuit court's first
decision as Intertanko H, and the circuit court's amended decision as Intertanko III.
916
Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 488 (1990), reprinted in 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 120 (7th rev.
ed. 1998).
9171991 Wash. Laws ch. 200 (codified in relevant part at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 88.46).
91819 9 1 Wash. Laws ch. 200, pt. IV.
919Id. pt. VIII.
920

Washington waters include the adjacent ocean waters out to three nautical miles, much of the
Columbia River, and the waters often collectively referred to as "Puget Sound." Washington borders the
Province of British Columbia to the north, separated by a series of deep water international straits, and
the State of Oregon to the south, separated by the Columbia River.
921Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.040. The agency's BAP regulations were promulgated at Wash. Admin.
Code §§ 317-21-010 et seq. Other provisions require vessels to file oil spill contingency plans and proof
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tions promulgated by the OMS must be consistent with federal law. 922 At the
same time that it created the BAP regime for tankers, the Washington
legislature directed OMS to "screen" dry cargo and passenger vessels
entering Washington waters, and to identify those vessels which present a
923
substantial risk of harm to the public health and safety of the environment.
The legislature prescribed civil and criminal penalties for violations and
authorized the OMS to deny entry to any vessel that does not have a required
oil-spill prevention or contingency plan or evidence of financial responsibility. 924 Washington's BAP regulations went into effect on July 7, 1995.
Although it is too early to determine whether Washington will be as
aggressive in enforcing its regulations as it was in developing them, tank
vessel operators trading to ports in Washington, Oregon (via the Columbia
River), or British Columbia (via the boundary straits) must now add
Washington's BAP regulations to the international, federal and, for Canadabound vessels, Canadian legal standards with which they must comply.
a. The Preemption Challenge and the Court's Decision
The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)
92 5
challenged sixteen of the Washington BAP regulations in federal court.

of compliance with the state's financial responsibility requirements. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46.060 &
88.40.
922
Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.020; see also id. § 90.56.070 (requiring that state's oil and hazardous
substances spill prevention and response program be implemented in a manner consistent with federal
law to the greatest extent practicable).
923
1Id. § 88.46.050. The regulations for dry cargo and passenger vessels were not challenged in the
Intertanko suit.
924
1d. § 88.46.080 & .090.
925
The Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's summary of the challenged regulations:
Event Reporting-WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report all events such as collisions,
allisions and near-miss incidents for the five years preceding filing of a prevention plan, and all
events that occur thereafter for tankers that operate in Puget Sound.
Operating Procedures-Watch Practices-WAC 317-21-200. Requires tankers to employ specific
watch and lookout practices while navigating and when at anchor, and requires a bridge resource
management system that is the "standard practice throughout the owner's or operator's fleet," and
which organizes responsibilities and coordinates communication between members of the bridge.
Operating Procedures-Navigation-WAC 317-21-205. Requires tankers in navigation in state
waters to record positions every fifteen minutes, to write a comprehensive voyage plan before
entering state waters, and to make frequent compass checks while under way.
Operating Procedures-Engineering-WAC 317-21-210. Requires tankers in state waters to
follow specified engineering and monitoring practices.
Operating Procedures-Prearrival Tests and Inspections-WAC 317-21-215. Requires tankers to
undergo a number of tests and inspections of engineering, navigation and propulsion systems
twelve hours or less before entering or getting underway in state waters.
Operating Procedures-Emergency Procedures-WAC 317-21-220. Requires tanker masters to
post written crew assignments and procedures for a number of shipboard emergencies.
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The Washington State Attorney General's office, which had recently argued
in favor of federal preemption of state laws when it represented its own state
ferry system vessels, and was attempting to avoid application of more
stringent state requirements to those vessels, 926 argued againstpreemption in
Intertanko, when the state sought to regulate what the Washington governor
called "foreign" tanker owners. 927 The district court upheld all sixteen of the
regulations. 928 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the United States government
intervened, arguing that some, but not all, of the Washington regulations
were preempted. The circuit court's preemption analysis followed the
Operating Procedures-Events-WAC 317-21-225. Requires that when an event transpires in
state waters, such as a collision, allision or near-miss incident, the operator is prohibited from
erasing, discarding or altering the position plotting records and the comprehensive written voyage
plan.
Personnel Policies-Training-WAC 317-21-230. Requires operators to provide a comprehensive
training program for personnel that goes beyond that necessary to obtain a license or merchant
marine document, and which includes instructions on a number of specific procedures.
Personnel Policies-Illicit Drugs and Alcohol Use-WAC 317-21-235. Requires drug and alcohol
testing and reporting.0
Personnel Policies-Personnel Evaluation- WAC 317-21-240. Requires operators to monitor the
fitness for duty of crew members, and requires operators to at least annually provide a job
performance and safety evaluation for all crew members on vessels covered by a prevention plan
who serve for more than six months in a year.
Personnel Policies-Work Hours-WAC 317-21-245. Sets limitations on the number of hours
crew members may work.
Personnel Policies-Language-WAC 317-21-250. Requires all licensed deck officers and the
vessel master to be proficient in English and to speak a language understood by subordinate officers
and unlicensed crew. Also requires all written instruction to be printed in a language understood by
the licensed officers and unlicensed crew.
Personnel Policies-Record Keeping-WAC 317-21-255. Requires operators to maintain training
records for crew members assigned to vessels covered by a prevention plan.
Management-WAC 317-21-260. Requires operators to implement management practices that
demonstrate active monitoring of vessel operations and maintenance, personnel training, development, and fitness, and technological improvements in navigation.
Technology-WAC 317-21-265. Requires tankers to be equipped with global positioning system
receivers, two separate radar systems, and an emergency towing system.
Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports-WAC 317-21-540. Requires at least twenty-four
hours notice prior to entry of a tanker into state waters, and requires that the notice report any
conditions that pose a hazard to the vessel or the marine environment.
Intertanko
111, 1998 WL 547205, at *1-*2.
926
See Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific v. [Washington] Dep't of Transp., 836 P.2d 823, 1993
AMC 479 (Wash. 1992).
927
1n his letter to President Clinton, urging the President to stay out of the Intertanko lawsuit,
Governor Locke referred to Intertanko as "an association of foreign tanker owners." See Letter from Gary
Locke, Governor of Washington, to President Bill Clinton (Mar. 24, 1997), supra Part I, note 6, at 1.
Those familiar with Intertanko, however, know that a number of U.S. flag tanker operators are Intertanko
members. See <http://www.intertanko.com/about/framemain.htm> (listing members).
92
81nternational Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry (Intertanko 1), 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1500-01,
1997 AMC 512 (W.D. Wash. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Intertanko v. Locke
(Intertanko 11), 148 F.3d 1053, 1998 AMC 2113 (9th Cir.), amended, Intertanko v. Locke (Intertanko III),
1998 WL 547205 (9th Cir. 1998).
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traditional approach, 929 but omitted the "uniformity versus locality" step of
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 930 The court upheld all but one of
the sixteen BAP regulations, relying almost entirely on the OPA 90 § 1018
saving clause and Hammond for its rule of decision. 93 1 The court held that
the Washington "technology" requirement for navigation and towing equipment constituted a "design" requirement, and was therefore preempted by
932
Title II of the PWSA]PTSA.
b. The Court's Construction of § 1018: Does it Provide New Authority
for Regulatory "Overlap"?
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Ray explained its prior
decisions upholding "reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures" by noting that none of its earlier cases
sustaining the application of state laws to federally licensed or inspected
vessels involved an "overlap" between the federal and state laws. 933 The
Court also held that states were preempted by the PWSA/PTSA from
prescribing higher safety equipment requirements or safety standards for
929

1nterestingly, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Ray striking down Washington requirements
for navigation and collision avoidance equipment, the court in Intertanko began its analysis by citing the
presumption against preemption of a state's historic police power. Intertanko 111, 1998 WL 547205, at
*3. The court did not examine whether regulations on tanker equipment, manning, training, watchstanding,9 30and drug and alcohol testing fell within the state's "historic" police powers.
1d. at *14. In its Commerce Clause analysis in Ray, the Supreme Court concluded that "a
requirement that a vessel take on a tug escort when entering a particular body of water is not the type of
regulation that demands a uniform national rule." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S 151, 179, 1978
AMC 527 (1978) (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)). The Ninth Circuit
made
no similar findings regarding the sixteen BAP regulations.
93
1Section 1018 is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718, which provides in relevant parts:
§ 2718. Relationship to other law:
(a) Preservation of State authorities; Solid Waste Disposal Act
Nothing in this chapter or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political
subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; or
(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties
Nothing in this chapter, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of Title
26, shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State
or political subdivision thereof(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in
nature) for any violation of law;
relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.
932
1ntertanko 111, 1998 WL 547205, at * 12.
933
Ray, 435 U.S. at 164.
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vessels. 934 The OPA 90 Conference Committee Report, Congress' last
statement of its legislative intent, made it clear that OPA 90 was not meant
to disturb the Court's decision in Ray.9 3 5 No one seriously disputes that the
Washington BAP regulations "overlap" with federal laws and international
conventions on the same subject. 936 Accordingly, the validity of much of the

Ninth Circuit's Intertanko decision turns on the court's conclusion that
Congress intended that § 1018 would shield from preemption any state law
on a subject addressed by OPA 90, without regard to whether the state law
"overlapped" with federal law or constituted a safety or equipment standard.
The Supreme Court, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,9 37 characterized the
court's task in evaluating the effect of a preemption clause as one of
identifying the "domain" of the clause. Similarly, a court tasked with
determining the effect of § 1018 on the states' authority to regulate merchant
vessel safety and pollution prevention must determine the "domain" of §
1018. In undertaking the task, the courts have a number of sources that may
provide guidance. As Chief Justice Marshall observed long ago, "[w]here
the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes on every
938
thing from which aid can be derived."
To be certain, Congress could have been clearer in drafting § 1018 to
define the domain of state laws to be "saved" under the provision. In the two
decades between 1970, when Congress first employed the phrase "any
requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of any oil into any

waters within such State" in the 1970 Water Quality Improvement Act, 9 3 9
and 1990, when it drafted OPA 90, Congress had ample opportunity to refine
its preemption, non-preemption, and saving clauses. On the other hand,
despite the phrase's linguistic shortcomings, there is something to be said for
using familiar terminology. Marine hull insurers, for example, continue to

934

1d. at 171 & 176. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals addressed this aspect of Ray.
See supra Part I1,
note 689 and accompanying text.
936
0ne example with potential foreign policy implications is the state's drug and alcohol testing
requirement. The state rule overlaps with federal regulations on the same subject but extends to some
foreign mariners that the federal rule exempted. The Coast Guard's chemical abuse testing regulations for
vessels contain a section avoiding "conflict with foreign laws." 46 C.F.R. § 16.207. The rulemaking
analysis cites, among other considerations, a statement by the Canadian government that a requirement
to test Canadian citizens may violate the Canadian Human Rights Act. See 53 Fed. Reg. 47,064, 47,070
(DOT 1988). The Washington regulation, WAC 317-21-235(2), contains no such exemption, and the
agency made it clear that it intended to apply its prevention plan requirements to all vessels, even those
in transit through Washington waters en route to Canadian ports. See supra note 805.
917518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)).
938United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (quoted in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456
U.S.93925, 28 (1982)).
See supra Part II, note 691.
935
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underwrite losses caused by "pirates, rovers, [and] assailing thieves," 940 not
because rovers and assailing thieves are an easily understood peril, but
because the American Institute drafters know that precedent is available to
guide courts and arbitrators in applying such Elizabethan era terms to
modem situations. It would not be extravagant to impute a similar "trust for
the familiar language" to Congress, in its drafting of § 1018.
(1) Is the Domain of § 1018 Coextensive with All of the Subjects
Addressed by OPA 90?
In its statutory preemption analysis, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the BAP regulations were preempted by OPA 90, the PWSA/PTSA, or the
Tank Vessel Act (TVA) (presumably, by TVA, the court meant all of the
Title 33 and Title 46 statutes not included in the first two statutes). The court
concluded that § 1018 precludes preemption by any provision of OPA 90,
but that it does not "explicitly address" whether the state regulations may be
preempted by any other federal acts. 94 ' The court's discussion of the
meaning and intent of § 1018 focuses on the location of that saving clause
in Title I of OPA 90. The court examined only two segments of the actual
language used in § 1018. First, the court analyzed whether the limiting
phrase "Nothing in this Act" should be construed as applying only to Title
I of OPA 90 (as Intertanko argued), or to all nine titles (as the state argued).
The court concluded that § 1018 applied to all nine titles. 942 The court
skipped over the operative terms "liability or requirements with respect to
the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State." The court
simply concluded that "because the oil-spill prevention requirements set
forth in the BAP Regulations clearly 'respect' the discharge of oil, they are
not preempted by anything in OPA 90. " 94 3 In effect, the court held that the
domain of the § 1018 saving clause extends to any field addressed by any of
OPA 90's nine titles including the numerous spill prevention provisions in
Title IV of the Act.
The legislative history lends no support to the court's conclusion that §
1018 was intended to provide new state regulatory authority over tanker
safety and pollution prevention. The Conference Committee report twice
94 0

See American Institute Hull Clauses (1977), reprinted in A. Parks, The Law and Practice of Marine
Insurance and Average, app. 6 (1987).
94 1
1ntertanko Il, 1998 WL 547205, at *5.
94 2
1d. at *4.
94 3
1d. In footnote 6 the court briefly examined the term "respect" and concluded that it extended to
any subject covered by OPA 90: "[b]ecause one of the explicit 'objectives' of OPA 90 is oil-spill
prevention, see OPA 90 §§ 2701-2718 (Title IV-Oil Spill Prevention), § 1018 prevents anything in OPA
90 from preempting state law in thisfield." Id. n.6 (emphasis added).
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speaks of "preserving" state authority. 944 Section 310 of Senate Bill
686-the section that would have saved to the states the authority to regulate
tanker safety-was deleted by the Conference Committee. 945 The Ninth
Circuit did not discuss the importance of this aspect of legislative history.
The operative § 1018 phrase "requirement or liability with respect to the
discharge of oil or hazardous substances" language is identical in all relevant
947
respects (other than its location) 946 with saving clauses in the CWA,
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 948 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA), 94 9 and
Deepwater Port Act (DPA). 950 There is every reason to believe that Congress
was aware of the prior treatment given to saving provisions incorporating
that language when it drafted § 1018. 9 5 1 Had it looked for judicial
constructions of the saving clause in those other statutes, the Ninth Circuit
would have found that no federal court has ever construed the language as
extending beyond liability and removal activities. 952 The CWA § 1321 (o)(2)
saving clause first appeared in the Water Quality Improvement Act, and was
reviewed by the Supreme Court in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.953 Significantly, the Court in Askew expressed reservations about
whether that saving clause would insulate the Florida oil spill equipment
requirements from preemption. 954 In Ray, the Court rejected the state of

944See
supra Part II, note 708.
945
See supra Part 11,notes 687-88 and accompanying text.
946
Section 1018(c) adds the words "or substantial threat of a discharge," but nothing in the court's
opinion suggests that the addition was material to the court's prevention rationale.
94733 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State or
political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of
oil or hazardous substance into any waters within such State").
94842 U.S.C. § 9614(a) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any
State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous
substances in such State").
94943 U.S.C. § 1656(e)(1) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed or interpreted as preempting
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with
respect to the discharge, or threat of discharge, of oil or other pollution by oil").
95033 U.S.C. § 1517(k) ("This section shall not be interpreted to preempt the field of liability or to
preclude any State from imposing additional requirements or liability for any discharge of oil from a
deepwater
port or a vessel within any safety zone").
95
'The Supreme Court imputes to Congress an awareness of the courts' treatment of federal statutes.
See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 279, 1977 AMC 566 (1977) (reasoning that "[w]e
can safely assume that Congress was aware of the holding" of cases construing the federal licensing law).
952
See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973);
Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 1979 AMC 1187 (4th Cir. 1979).
953411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
954
1d. at 336-37 ("Nor can we say at this point that [Florida's] regulations ... requiring 'containment
gear' pursuant to § 7(2)(a) of the Florida Act would be per se invalid because the subject to be regulated
requires uniform federal regulations .... Resolution of this question, as well as the question whether such
regulations will conflict with Coast Guard regulations ... should await a concrete dispute ... ").
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Washington's argument that anything in the CWA authorized the state's
Tanker Act. The state conceded in that case that the equipment requirements
in its tanker act were preempted. 955 Similarly, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond,956 the state of Alaska conceded at trial that its tanker equipment
requirements were preempted. The state did not argue that the § 1321(o)(2)
saving clause "saved" state authority to regulate vessel equipment from
preemption by the PWSA/PTSA. In the later appeal of the district court's
decision on the Alaska ban on deballasting water from cargo tanks in state
waters, even the Ninth Circuit declined to base its decision on the "express"
saving clause in § 1321(o)(2). 957 Despite the fact that the "liability and
requirements with respect to the discharge of oil" language had never before
been interpreted as authority for state prevention programs, the Ninth Circuit
in Intertanko concluded that Congress intended, when it transplanted the
operative language into Title I of OPA 90, to give the phrase new meaning.
(2) Does § 1018 Shield State Regulations From Preemption by Federal
Laws Other than OPA 90?

Taking § 1018's limiting language "Nothing in this Act" at face value, the
court concluded that § 1018 does not explicitly address whether state
oil-spill prevention rules may be preempted by federal "Acts" other than
OPA 90.958 Accordingly, the court turned to consider whether the BAP
regulations were preempted by acts such as the PWSA/PTSA, as construed
by the Supreme Court in Ray and the Ninth Circuit in Hammond. In
considering preemption under the PWSA/PTSA, the court appeared to read
the Supreme Court's decision in Ray as recognizing only three relevant
classifications of tank vessel regulations under the acts. A given regulation
constitutes a "design and construction" requirement, an "operational"
requirement, or a "tanker traffic" regulation. 959 The court apparently rejected
the more discriminating international and federal classification scheme,
which distinguishes vessel CDEM 960 standards, crewmember training,
95 5

Ray, 435 U.S. at 178 n.28.

956

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 1978 AMC 1697 (D. Alaska 1978).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 490-91 & n.9, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
95
81ntertanko lll, 1998 WL 547205, at *5. It is not clear why the court limited the observation to
federal
"Acts," rather than including all of the sources of law set out in Article VI.
959
1d. at *6. ("Title I of the PWSA focuses on tanker traffic, Title 11of the Act is concerned with
tanker design, construction, and operation"). It is not clear from the court's opinion whether the court
believed
that there exists a category of equipment requirements that are not also design requirements.
96 0
See supra Part Ii, note 414 (describing construction, design, equipment, and manning regime under
the LOS Convention) and 46 U.S.C. § 3703 (requiring Secretary to prescribe regulations for tanker
design, construction, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning).
957
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qualification and watchstanding requirements, and safety management
systems, from those rules governing vessel operations. Under the Ninth
Circuit's simplified classification, the entire subject matter of the STCW
convention would be analyzed as vessel operations rules, as would the ISM
Code and the marine casualty reporting system.
Despite the repeated emphasis by the Ninth Circuit in Hammond that the
Alaska ballasting statute was an "ocean pollutant discharge" regulation, and
that the case was distinguishable on that basis from Ray, the same court in
Intertanko characterized the Alaska statute as an vessel "operation" regulation. 961 The court in Intertanko then concluded that "virtually all" of the
challenged BAP regulations were operational requirements, and that their
validity was therefore controlled by the court's holding against preemption
of state vessel operational rules in Hammond.962 The only exception the
court found was the BAP "technology" regulation requiring global positioning system (GPS) receivers, twin radars with ARPAs, and emergency towing
963
equipment, all of which the court concluded were "design" requirements.
The circuit court's original opinion glossed over the question whether the
fifteen surviving Washington "operations" regulations for tankers fell within
the class of tanker operations rules required by Title II of the PWSA/PTSA,
or the local operations rules addressed to the "peculiarities of local waters"
within Title I of the Act, even though Ray teaches that the distinction is
critical in a PWSA/PTSA preemption analysis. Close examination of Ray
reveals that the Court's discussion of the Washington tug escort rule
characterized the rule as "an operating rule arising from the peculiarities of
local waters that call for special precautionary measures." 964 The difference
is an important one. Internal vessel "operating" rules regarding activities
such as ship safety management systems, drug and alcohol testing, crew rest
periods, and equipment testing are properly subjects for national rules under
Title II of the PWSA. By contrast, the need for a local harbor pilot in the Port
96 t

1ntertanko I, 1998 WL 547205, at *11.("Because the discharge of ballast involves an 'operation'
directly relating to the sailing of a tanker, [Hammond] undermines Intertanko's argument that the Ray
court used 'design and construction' as 'shorthand' for 'design, construction and operations."'). Of
course, the court in Hammond characterized the Alaska ballasting law as an "ocean pollutant discharge"
regulation, not as a vessel operation regulation. Had the Hammond court characterized it as an operations
regulations, as did the Coast Guard (see supra note 850) and as Justice White argued (see supra notes
881-84), the relevance of the NPDES provisions of the CWA would have been further cast into doubt.
9621998 WL 547205, at *11. The opinion provides no rationale for the court's conclusion that the
vessel manning, crew training, random drug and alcohol testing, and English language capability
regulations
constituted "operational" requirements.
963
1d. at *12.
964435 U.S. at 171. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the test for whether the state rule was
preempted was whether "the Secretary has either promulgated his own requirement for Puget Sound
tanker navigation, or has decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all." Id. at 171-72.
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of Philadelphia 965 or an escort tug in the narrow waters of Rosario Strait are
not. 966 The fact that the Washington BAP regulations were to be measured
against a "best available protection," standard, and are to be applied
throughout Washington waters, including the coastal waters of the Pacific
Ocean, the Columbia River, and the waters of Puget Sound and the boundary
straits, demonstrate that the BAP regulations are not based on the "peculiarities of local waters," but rather on the state's judgment regarding
967
acceptable risk levels for all state waters.
(3) Does § 1018 Override An Agency's Authority to Preempt State Law
Under Other Federal Statutes or Treaties?

One of the more puzzling conclusions in the Ninth Circuit's original
Intertanko decision was relegated to a footnote, where the court concluded
that § 1018 stripped the Coast Guard of delegated authority to preempt state
68
laws that it would otherwise have under statutes other than OPA 90.9
Whatever the court's views may be on agency preemption, § 1018 does not
seem like an appropriate authority to curtail it. Moreover, the court's
construction of § 1018 creates an inconsistency the court failed to resolve.
At one point the court held that § 1018 "does not explicitly address whether
state oil-spill prevention rules may be preempted by federal 'Acts' other
than OPA 90"969 and that "§ 1018 by its plain language has no automatic
impact on preemption caused by those [other] statutes. '970 This appears to be
the only reasonable interpretation of the clause's "Nothing in this Act"
965Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
966Cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (likening tug escort
to the
local pilot requirement in Cooley).
967The district court thought otherwise. See Intertanko 1, 947 F. Supp. at 1495 (holding that all sixteen
of the BAP regulations under challenge "arise 'from the peculiarities of local waters that call for special
precautionary measures."') (quoting Ray, 435 U.S. at 171). The district court apparently believed that the
state was free to classify all of its waters as unique, and therefore entitled to special precautionary
measures. When the challengers pointed out to the Ninth Circuit that "Ray's analysis of 'operating rules'
applies only to those requirements that 'arise from the peculiarities of local waters,"' the court's answer
was that "the operating requirements imposed by the BAP regulations are designed for the same 'local
waters,' namely Puget Sound, as the Washington Tanker Law contested in Ray." Intertanko I11, 1998 WL
547205, at *10. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion misreads the Washington BAP regulations, which apply
not only to the waters of Puget Sound, but also to the ocean waters out to three miles and to the Columbia
River. The court's response also begs the question for which Ray demands an answer: are the BAP
regulations "in reality based on water depth in Puget Sound or some other local peculiarities," [Ray, 435
U.S. at 175], or do they simply represent a contrary state judgment? See 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 200, §
101(3)(c), in which the Washington legislature found that "Washington's navigable waters are treasured
environmental and economic resources that the state cannot afford to place at undue risk from an oil
spill."
96
81ntertanko 11, 148 F.3d at 1068 n. 14, amended by Intertanko 111, 1998 WL 547205, at *14 n.15.
9691ntertanko 111, 1998 WL 547205, at *5 (emphasis added).
970
1d.
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domain-defining language. However, the court then went on to conclude that
§ 1018 precludes agency regulations from preempting state laws or regulations even if the legal basis for the regulation is a statute other than OPA
90.97 1 Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended §
1018 to limit the preemptive effect of agency regulations promulgated under
authorities other than OPA 90.972 In Askew, the Supreme Court suggests that
Coast Guard regulations might preempt state requirements for pollution
containment gear, notwithstanding the similar saving clause now incorpo973
rated into the CWA.
c. May States Now Impose Standards Stricter Than Those
Set by Treaties?
As the overlap between international standards and the Washington tanker
regulations became apparent, it was inevitable that the Ninth Circuit would
be called upon to revisit its conclusion in Hammond974 regarding the force
of the IMO-sponsored conventions. Fourteen nations and the Commission of
the European Community protested the Washington regulations, warning
that differing regimes in different parts of the U.S. create uncertainty and
confusion for foreign vessels and set an "unwelcome precedent" for other
federally-administered nations. 975 The United States urged the Ninth Circuit
to reverse the district court's judgment because the lower court had "failed
to pay adequate attention to the immense foreign affairs interests of the
United States in the international maritime field. '976 The overlap between
the state laws challenged in Intertanko and the IMO conventions went far
beyond the single ballast water regulation in MARPOL Annex I at issue in
97 1

1d. at *14 n.15.
1n its original decision, the court sought to explain the apparent inconsistency by observing that:
Although § 1018 expressly applies only to OPA 90, it shapes the "full purposes and objectives" of
Congress, Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, with respect to the entire legislative field of oil-spill
972

prevention .... Accordingly, we hold that the Coast Guard impermissibly acts beyond its
"congressionally delegated authority" ...not only when it purports to preempt state oil-spill
prevention laws under the authority of OPA 90. but also when it purports to do so under the
authority of other federal statutes.
Intertanko H1,
148 F.3d at 1068 n.14. Nothing in the Hines passage cited provides any insight into how
a saving clause in one statute, which had never before been used or construed to address anything other
than liability and removal laws, "shapes" the full purposes and objectives of Congress with respect to the
entire field of oil spill prevention. The court's amended decision reaches essentially the same conclusion,
1998 WL 547205, at
but omits any reference to the Coast Guard's rulemaking authority. Intertanko 111,
"14 n.15.
97411 U.S. 325, 336-37. 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
9 74
Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 489, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
denied
9 75
See supra Part I, notes 1-3.
976
Brief of Intervenor-U.S., Intertanko v. Locke, supra Part 1, note 2, at 2.
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Hammond. Washington's BAP regulations allegedly overlapped with numerous provisions of the SOLAS (including its coming ISM Code) and
STCW conventions, and encroached on foreign vessel transit rights under
the LOS Convention and the VTMS Agreement with Canada. 977 Additionally, Washington's enforcement of the BAP regulations against foreign
tankers directly implicated the port State control articles of all three IMO
conventions, a key distinction between Hammond and Intertanko.
(1) The Hammond Decision is Treated as a Rule of Law
The Intertanko court avoided any analysis of the preemptive effect of
SOLAS, MARPOL, and various other international agreements, or the effect
of the conventions' port State control articles, when it ruled that the
"argument that the BAP Regulations are preempted by these international
treaties is undermined by our decision in" Hammond.978 The court then
explained that the enactment of OPA 90 by Congress "only reinforces this
court's conclusions in [Hammond] that 'strict international uniformity' with
respect to the regulation of tankers is not 'mandated' by federal law and that
'international agreements set only minimum standards.' ' '979 To reach any
other conclusion, the court explained, "we would have to read § 1018 to
provide that the Act permits state tanker regulations only when the field in
question is not subject to international regulation." The court's conclusion
again fails to accord treaties their preemptive effect under Article VI of the
Constitution. By its own terms, § 1018 saves state laws from preemption
only by OPA 90. As such, § 1018 could not "save" state laws against
preemption by valid U.S. treaties, which, no less than federal statutes, are the
Law of the Land.
Nothing in the Intertanko II decision suggests that the court looked at the
provisions of any of the treaties involved (or the implementing statutes or
regulations) to determine whether they occupied any of the fields addressed
by the state regulations. Nor does the opinion indicate that the court
examined the nature of the treaties to determine whether they manifested an
intent to displace non-uniform state or local laws within the nations party to
them.9 80 The court does not discuss the port State control regime or the treaty
9 77

The SOLAS and STCW overlaps are listed in Appendix A to the Brief for Intervenor-Intemational
Chamber of Shipping, Intertanko v. Locke, 1998 WL 547205 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-35010).
9 78
1ntertanko Ill,
1998 WL 547205, at *8.
97 9
1d.

980 For example, had the court examined the SOLAS and STCW conventions, it would have found that
each limits the extent to which parties to the convention may enact additional laws on the su.bject. ISee,
e.g., SOLAS, supra Part II, note 420, art. VI(d) ("All matters which are not expressly provided for in the
present Convention remain subject to the legislation of the Contracting Govemments") (emphasis added).
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requirement for parties to accept valid certificates from other parties as
evidence that the vessel complies with the applicable standards. Finally, the
court does not appear to have examined the purposes and objectives of the
President and Congress in entering into those treaties, thereby agreeing to
limit U.S. control over foreign vessels in U.S. ports and waters.
The court in Intertanko uncritically applied Hammond's sweeping generalization that international agreements set only minimum standards,
despite critical differences between the underlying treaty provisions involved in the two cases. The court in Hammond repeatedly emphasized the
unique subject matter of the case as "ocean pollutant discharges." The only
treaty Hammond examined was the 1978 MARPOL Protocol, which the
court concluded was not yet in effect. 98' The Hammond decision apparently
assumes, without analysis, that the MARPOL regulation permitting the
discharge of clean ballast did not apply within the territorial waters of the
U.S.,982 and did not examine the port State control and enforcement articles.
By contrast, the international CDEM standards prescribed by SOLAS and
MARPOL, and the training, qualification, and watchkeeping standards
prescribed by the STCW Convention, along with the port State control
limitations contained in each of those conventions, are intended to apply to
foreign vessels flying the flag of any party while those vessels are within
U.S. ports and waters. Those standards go far beyond "ocean pollutant
discharges."
The court in Intertanko also appears to confuse the question of whether
uniform international laws are wise or necessary (a policy question) with
whether a treaty to which the U.S. is party is the supreme Law of the Land
(an Article VI question). As with its earlier decision in Hammond, the
court's preemption analysis in Intertanko seems to weigh the need for
uniformity in one context (uniformity is "critical" in vessel design 983)
against the needs in another context (local environmental regulations can
"co-exist" with federal law 9 84 ). Whatever the court may think about the
judgment of the President and Congress to enter into treaties or international
agreements that limit port State control authority and provide reciprocity and
mutual recognition of compliance with internationally agreed-upon standards, once those agreements are perfected they carry the full preemptive

9"
726 F.2d at 494 n.14.
982
Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 497 n.17, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985)
(concluding that the U.S. acts as a "sovereign" in its territorial sea, and was free to prescribe its own
standards).
983Hammond, 726 F.2d at 493.
9841d.
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effect of any other federal law. 985 This confusion in the court's reasoning
may explain why, in the fourteen years since Hammond was decided, no
other circuit has cited the case as authority for its holding that international
agreements set only minimum standards.
With respect, the Intertanko court's Article VI analysis is off course and
its reliance on Hammond inappropriate. Because congressional (and presidential) intent to preempt state law is the ultimate touchstone in any
preemption analysis, the question the court should have asked is not whether
Congress and the President have (or had in 1984, when Hammond was
decided) some generalized intent to pursue "strict uniformity" between
federal law and the standards and procedures established by the treaties they
entered into. The correct question in an Article VI analysis is whether the
President and the Congress intended, when they entered into a particular
treaty, agreed to limit U.S. authority as a port State, and conferred on the
Secretary authority to accept a foreign vessel's compliance with the treaty as
satisfaction of the requirements for entry into U.S. waters, to displace state
laws on the subjects covered by that treaty. In determining whether Congress
and the President explicitly or implicitly intended to occupy a field
addressed by a treaty, the differences between treaties and statutes is critical.
Absent an exception or reservation by the President at the time of ratification
or accession, or treaty language permitting local variation among political
subdivisions of the parties, a treaty presumptively binds the entire nation, or
it is not binding at all. 986 Accordingly, any analysis of the preemptive effect
of the IMO-sponsored treaties on state regulation of foreign vessels must
begin with the treaties' port State control articles. As the fourth part of this
article will more fully discuss, it may be time to consider whether the
presumption against preemption should be eliminated or even reversed in
cases where state regulations overlap with a treaty on a subject matter that
the states have not traditionally regulated under their police powers.

5

98 The analysis should not confuse treaty provisions in SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW that require

States-party to the conventions to implement the treaty standards by prescribing laws-for the nation's
own vessels-that are no less strict than those established by the convention. When a nation acts as a flag
State, it is free to prescribe stricter standards for its own vessels. By contrast, when a party acts in its
capacity as a port State or a coastal State, it is not free to prescribe stricter standards than those agreed
to in the treaty, unless the treaty otherwise permits. Foreign vessels arriving in a nation's ports or waters
that meet the international standards, as evidenced by the vessel's certificates, satisfy the conventions'
requirements on that standard. This recognition lies at the heart of the quid pro quo aspect of the
conventions.
986See supra Part I, ll.B.2(e) and note 736.
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(2) Did Congress Abandon Its Commitment to InternationalStandardsfor
Vessel Safety and Pollution Prevention in OPA 90?

If in conflict with standards or procedures governed by an international
treaty of the U.S., the Washington regulations must yield to the treaty unless
state regulatory authority over the subject is "saved" by some other federal
law. Under the familiar canons of construction, the courts must construe §
1018 consistently with U.S. treaty obligations, absent clear congressional
intent to supersede those treaties. 987 Nothing in OPA 90 or its legislative
history, and no authority cited by the court in Intertanko II, demonstrates a
congressional intent to relieve the states of the preemptive effect of the
IMO-sponsored marine safety or pollution prevention conventions. 988 Nevertheless, Intertanko 1I appears, like its Hammond predecessor, to impute to
the U.S. Congress a view that treaties represent only "minimum standards."
The suggestion cries out for a response.
The Ninth Circuit did not reveal the basis for its conclusion that OPA 90
"reinforced" its conclusions in Hammond that "international agreements set
only minimum standards." 989 The district court reached the same conclusion,
largely upon its understanding of Congress' decision to phase out single hull
tankers without waiting for the other IMO members to amend the MARPOL
convention. 990 According to the district court:
Intertanko's assertion that applying the savings clause to the prevention
requirements would run afoul of international standards is undennined by
other provisions of the Act. Foremost is the requirement that oil tankers have
double hulls. 46 U.S.C. § 3703a. This contradicts the international standards
imposed by Regulation 13F to Annex I of MARPOL, and demonstrates that
Congress was not overly concerned with maintaining uniformity with such
standards. 99'

The district court is confused on chronology and failed to distinguish
between the national government making exceptions to individual treaty
provisions and state governments legislating contrary to a U.S. treaty. The
relevant MARPOL standard to which the court refers (Regulation I/13F) was
987 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) ("It has been a maxim of statutory construction since
the decision in Murray v. The Charming Bets)... that 'an act of congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains"').
9881t
is true that, in enacting OPA 90, Congress implicitly rejected the CLC and Fund international
conventions on oil spill liability. See Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation, supra Part
II, note 685. But the Act does not purport to renounce or supersede any of the safety and pollution
prevention
conventions.
9 89
1ntertanko Ill,
1998 WL 547205, at *8.
99°Intertanko 1, 947 F. Supp. at 1492.
99 1
1d. The court also cites OPA 90 § 3001 to support its conclusion, even though it acknowledges that
§ 3001 applies only to the international liability and removal regimes. Id. at 1492 n.4.
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adopted by the IMO members through tacit amendment on July 5, 1991; in
other words, one year after OPA 90 was enacted. 992 Thus, when Congress
enacted 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (OPA 90 § 4115) it did not "contradict"
MARPOL. Like § 4115 of OPA 90, MARPOL Regulation 1/13F calls for a
phase-out of single hull tankers over a period of years. Unlike § 4115, which
will require all vessels to be designed with double hull construction,
MARPOL Regulation 1/13F also authorizes vessels built to an alternative
design that provides the same level of protection against oil outflow as the
double hull design. 993 MARPOL contains explicit procedures by which a
party to the convention may except to amendments. 994 The U.S. followed the
established procedures in making known its intent to not be bound by
MARPOL amendments permitting alternatives to the double hull requirement. 995 Accordingly, even now, the U.S. has no obligation under international law to permit vessels meeting the alternative design regulations to
enter U.S. waters (other than those in innocent or transit passage). 996 Had the
district or circuit courts examined the multitude of international vessel safety
and pollution prevention standards to which the nation has agreed-and
which the nation is now bound to follow-rather than the single example
where the U.S. adopted a stricter national standard, its seems more likely that
the court would have realized-as did the National Research Council-that
for nearly all of the standards established by the SOLAS, MARPOL, and
STCW Conventions, the U.S. government favors the international standards
997
and is extremely selective in its decisions to take unilateral action.
(3) Saving the "Transit Protests" for Another Day

Owners and masters of vessels transiting through Washington waters in
innocent passage or in passage to or from a port in Canada face two concerns
over the Washington BAP regulations. The first concern for vessel operators
992

See Double Hull Standards for Tank Vessels Carrying Oil, 56 Fed. Reg. 44,051, 44,051-52 (DOT
1991). MARPOL reg. 1/13G was similarly amended, but the district court did not discuss that provision.
993
See supra part II, note 541 and accompanying text.
994
See supra Part II, notes 542-43.
995

996

1d.

MARPOL. supra Part 11,note 388, art. 16(4)(b) ("Any party [to the convention] which has declined
to accept an amendment to an Annex shall be treated as a non-Party only for the purpose of application
of that amendment."). In accordance with MARPOL art. 16(2)(f)(ii), the U.S. notified the SecretaryGeneral of the IMO that the regulation 1/13F and I/1
3G amendment would not enter into force in the U.S.
until the U.S. provided its "express approval" of the amendment. See supra Part II, note 543.
97
9 1n 1994, the National Research Council examined the United States' practice as a port State. The
U.S. reservation to the MARPOL alternative to double hull construction on tankers was the only example
the study could identify in which the United States had taken unilateral action to promulgate standards
more rigorous than the international standards. National Research Council, Minding the Helm 38-39
(1994).
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is the potential tort liability that may flow from a failure to comply with any
applicable state regulations-including the BAP regulations. At least one
court has held that a violation of a state statute may constitute negligence in
a claim within the federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 998 The tort
liability risk arises without regard to whether the state actually enforces its
regulations against such vessels. Second, Washington has made it clear that
it intends to enforce its tanker regulations against foreign vessels passing
through Washington waters en route to Canadian ports in British Columbia. 999 Washington's regulation of vessels transiting through U.S. waters en
route to a British Columbia port may conflict with the U.S.-Canada
Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the
Juan de Fuca Region (VTMS Agreement), 1000 which exempts such vessels
from U.S. requirements if they comply with applicable Canadian laws. 10 0'
The Ninth Circuit declined to reach the question whether the Washington
BAP regime conflicted with the VTMS Agreement or a related challenge
based on the state's alleged encroachment on the right of innocent passage.
After concluding that the issues had not been raised in the court below, the
circuit court indicated that "the state defendants have not had the opportunity
to develop the record concerning whether the BAP Regulations practically
impair the right of innocent passage or are enforced in a manner that is
inconsistent with the bilateral agreement with Canada covering traffic in the
Strait of Juan De Fuca."' 0 02 The state's complaint about the need to develop
a "record" seems disingenuous, given the state's announced intent to apply
its regulations to all vessels in state waters. 00 3 Moreover, the Canadian
protest that Washington's actions violate the VTMS Agreement certainly
presents a foreign relations challenge to the Washington regulations. The
question whether state action undermines the foreign affairs of the nation is
one for the President and Congress, whose judgments are generally binding
on the judiciary.10 0 4 The relevance of the state's "record" to the resolution of
such questions seems questionable, given the state's announced intent to
apply its regulations to all vessels in state waters and the representations by
99

81n re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 67 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 & n.4, 1996 AMC 151 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1220 (1996) (finding no error where a trial court relied on a Michigan state statute and
a city ordinance as evidence of excessive speed). Violations of state law might also factor into a finding
of unseaworthiness.
999
See supra note 805.
'°°°See supra Part II, note 458 and accompanying text.
0
' 0lSee
supra Part II, in IV.B.
00
' 00lntertanko II1, 1998 WL 547205, at *9.
1 3See supra note 805.
00
4See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in
International Law Decisions in National Courts 14 (T. Franck & G. Fox eds. 1996) (quoting Justice
Jackson in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
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the United States regarding the protests by Canada. Nevertheless, by
declining to examine the preemptive effect of those agreements or the
international law right of innocent passage, the court has left both issues for
another day.

d. Does OPA 90 Embody All of the FederalLegislative and Foreign
Policy Purposes and Objectives on Tanker Regulation?
In conducting the "conflict" inquiry in its preemption analysis, in which
the court must determine whether the state law stands as an obstacle to
accomplishment and execution of the "full purposes and objectives of
Congress,"'10 0 5 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it "must look not to the
purposes and objectives of any single Act, but instead to Congress's
° 6
overarching purposes and objectives in the relevant legislative field."''
The court then concluded that in the field of tanker regulation, "the
overarching purposes of Congress" are best revealed by OPA 90, rather than
by the PWSA/PTSA or Tank Vessel Act, because it was the most recent
federal statute in the field and it was designed to "complement the other
acts." 10 0 7 By concluding that all of the relevant congressional purposes and
objectives were embodied in OPA 90, and that nothing in OPA 90 would be
frustrated by the BAP regulations, the court was spared the need to consider
any legislative or foreign policy objectives that Congress and the President
may have sought to obtain through all of the remaining chapters of Titles 33
and 46 of the U.S. Code, the numerous reciprocity and comity statutes, 10 0 8
the SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW Conventions, the various Treaties on
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, or the LOS Convention. Just as the
court cut short its analysis of preemption by international law by invoking
Hammond's "treaties set only minimum standards" rule, the court also cut
short any purposes and objectives analysis by concluding that only a single
statute was relevant to the analysis.

'°°Hines,
312 U.S. at 67.
0 06
1ntertanko II1, 1998 WL 547205, at *7 (citations omitted).
1007ld. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). It is not clear what support the Supreme Court's decision in
Hines lends to the Intertanko court's conclusion.
'°°SSee, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 3303, which Congress has noted "acknowledges the international concept
of comity with respect to recognizing inspections laws and standards for foreign flag vessels that are
note 560 and accompanying text (quoting H.R. Rep.
similar to those of the United States," supra Part 1I,
No. 98-338, at 130 (1983)).
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e. Where the Court's Interpretation of § 1018 Might Lead
If the Ninth Circuit's construction of § 1018 stands, and Congress takes
no action, several conclusions might follow. First, states might now be free
to prescribe their own oil spill prevention rules on any subject addressed by
OPA 90. For example, § 4115 of OPA 90 established a phase-out period for
single hull tank vessels in U.S. waters (with an exception for vessels in
innocent passage). 0 0 9 Whether a vessel is constructed with a single or
double hull is plainly a "design" requirement; a field that the Supreme Court
determined the federal government has occupied under Title II of the
PWSA/PTSA. Might it now be argued, however, that § 1018 "de-occupied"
vessel design requirements if the design is also addressed by OPA 90? At
least one state has enacted a ban on single hull tank barges from state waters,
or will require that such barges be escorted by a second towing vessel, earlier
than the dates called for by OPA 90.1010 Does the Intertanko court believe
that Congress intended when it put § 1018 in Title I of OPA 90 to permit
vessels to ban single hull tankers from state waters sooner than federal law
provides?
Second, the IMO treaty implementation process may be undermined. The
PWSA/PTSA expressly authorized the Secretary to modify any federal
regulation or standard prescribed under § 5 of the PWSA "to conform to the
provisions of an international treaty, convention, agreement or an amendment that is ratified by the U.S."' 0' 1 The "technical" provisions of the
principal IMO conventions may now be amended by a tacit acceptance
procedure. 0 1 2 Congress has expressly recognized the procedure and provided the Secretary with authority to implement amendments to some
conventions.10 1 3 However, new regulations implementing changes to the
international conventions will likely face a cool reception in any subsequent
preemption challenge in the Ninth Circuit, which has concluded, based on its
construction of a well-worn saving clause in Title I of OPA 90 (and the
NPDES saving clause in Hammond), that (1) Congress intended that
international agreements set only minimum standards, which the states are
free to exceed, (2) in the field of "tanker regulation" all of Congress'
purposes and objectives are revealed in OPA 90, so none of the purposes or
'O°°See 46 U.S.C. § 3703a.
10

'° R.I. Gen. Laws § 46-12.6-10 (1996). The Rhode Island law goes into effect on January 1, 2001.
By contrast, the federal law phases such vessels out over a period based on the vessel's age, but not later
than 2015.
11
10 See supra Part 11, note 629.
12
1 See SOLAS, supra Part II, note 420, art. VIII; STCW, supra Part I1,
note 388, art. XII; MARPOL,
supra Part 11, note 388, art. 16.
3
'°' PTSA, supra Part II, note 613, § 5(12); APPS, 33 U.S.C. § 1909 (MARPOL); 33 U.S.C. ch. 30;
33 U.S.C. § 1602(c) & (d).
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objectives of vessel safety and pollution prevention conventions need be
considered in a conflict analysis, and (3) Congress intended that any Coast
Guard regulations issued under the authority Congress delegated to the
agency to prescribe regulations implementing amendments to the convention
are not binding on the states. Two examples may help demonstrate the
problems inherent in the court's conclusion.
In OPA 90 legislative history not mentioned by the Ninth Circuit, the
Conference Committee announced that it intended the Coast Guard to look
to the STCW convention in setting the manning, training, qualification, and
watchkeeping standards for foreign tank vessels. 0 1 4 The STCW convention
was substantially amended in 1995. The amendments, which are discussed
in Part II of this article, 0 1 5 prescribe extensive requirements for officer and
crew training, certification, watchstanding practices, rest periods, and
voyage planning. 0 1 6 The Convention-a treaty under Article VI of the
Constitution-expressly provides that no party to the convention may
require foreign vessel officers or crews to meet requirements that go beyond
those set by the STCW Convention. 0 1 7 Nevertheless, under the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in Intertanko, the STCW will be seen as setting only
"minimum standards," that the states are free to exceed, as does Washington, 10 1 8 even though such state regulations would place the U.S. in violation
of the treaty prohibition against stricter port State standards.
A 1994 amendment to SOLAS-also a treaty under Article VI-added
Chapter IX to the convention, requiring operators of certain seagoing vessels
to implement the ISM Code by July 1, 1998.1019 In 1996, Congress enacted
enabling legislation for the ISM Code, which prescribed effective dates
identical to those the nation had agreed to in the SOLAS convention. 0 20 The
Coast Guard enforces ISM Code requirements for U.S. vessels as the flag
0 14

1

See supra Part I, note 565 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 132 (1990)).
See supra Part II, 1 IV.C.3.
01
1 6STCW Code, supra Part II, note 388, ch. VIII.
015

0 7

I

STCW, supra Part II, note 388, reg. 1/3. The regulations permit stricter rules only for seafarers on
vessels engaged in "near coastal voyages," not on foreign voyages.
0 18
' Washington's ambitions were revealed in a colloquy between the court and counsel for the
state-defendants during oral argument before the Ninth Circuit. The court asked counsel whether they
believed that OPA 90 would permit them to promulgate regulations applicable to foreign tank vessels
entering Washington waters requiring -that all of the vessel's officers attend a training course at a
Washington college. Counsel responded that they believed they had such authority. Nothing in the court's
opinion indicates that the court did not agree.
0
l 191nternational Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
(International Safety Management Code), Annex to IMO Res. A.741(18), done at London, Nov. 4, 1993,
reprinted in 6D Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 14-2 (7th rev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter ISM Code].
0 20
1 See Coast Guard Authorization Act, Pub. L. 104-324, tit. VI, § 602, 110 Stat. 3901 (1996)
(codified at 46 U.S.C. ch. 32).
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State Administration, 10 2' and for foreign vessels navigating in U.S. waters10 22 as the port State control authority under SOLAS. 10 23 The ISM Code
legislation directed the Coast Guard to promulgate regulations that would be
consistent with the Code developed by the IMO. 02 4 Congress made clear
that nothing in the Act "lessens the need for the Secretary to ... harmonize,
to the maximum extent feasible, U.S. requirements with those applying to
foreign-flag vessels operating in our waters."' 0 25 Together, these statements
demonstrate Congress' intent that U.S. rules on the ISM Code, both for U.S.
and foreign vessels, are to conform to SOLAS requirements. In promulgating the ISM Code regulations, the Coast Guard conformed to SOLAS and
concluded that state regulations prescribing "different or higher" standards
were preempted.10 26 Even though the Coast Guard's regulations were based
on a statute issued after OPA 90 was enacted, and required that the
regulations be consistent with international standards, under the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in Intertanko, the federal rules may not preempt the states
from prescribing stricter rules.
3. Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Jorling: Federal District Court Upholds A
New York Administrative Agency Order Banishing A Commercial Vessel
Operatorfrom State Waters

Following the accidental sinking of an oil barge in New York in 1990, the
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner ordered the Delaware corporation that owned the vessel to cease
operation of all its vessels involved in petroleum transportation in New York
waters. 0 27 The DEC Order also suspended the operating licenses for
fourteen vessels that had been issued to the same owner under the New York
Navigation Laws. 0 2 8 While abstaining from making a determination regard021

1
See
102 2

46 U.S.C. § 3205.
See 33 C.F.R. §§ 96.110(c), 96.210(a)(3) & 96.310(c) (applying requirements to foreign vessels
navigating in U.S. waters if "bound for ports or places under the jurisdiction of the U.S."). The
regulations do not apply to foreign vessels in innocent passage. See 62 Fed. Reg. 67,492, 67,494 (DOT
1997).
102 3
SOLAS, ch. I, reg. 19.
102446 U.S.C. § 3202(b); S. Rep. No. 104-160, at 28 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339,
4268.

10251996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4270.

1026 6 2 Fed. Reg. at 67,506.
'0 27 Berman Enters., Inc. v. Jorling, 793 F. Supp. 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 602 (2d Cir.
1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994).
'0 28As described by the court, Article 12 of the New York Navigation Laws ("Oil Spill Prevention,
Control and Compensation"), codified at §§ 170-197, prohibits the operation of any "major facility"
without a state license. The definition of "major facility" includes vessels which transfer petroleum
products to other vessels. N.Y. Nav. L. § 172(11).
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ing the DEC Commissioner's authority under state law to revoke the
company's state licenses, 0 2 9 the federal district court examined the question
whether the New York action was preempted by the PWSA or Title 46 of the
U.S. Code.
The district court applied a traditional preemption analysis and held that
the New York law was not preempted. 10 30 The court based it decision largely
on its understanding of the Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.' 0 3 ' Although the court examined the § 1018 saving clause in
OPA 90, it did so only as supplemental support for its decision. t0 32 The court
instead relied primarily on Professor Tribe's interpretation of the Supreme
Court's holding in Ray, 0 33 and concluded that the Supreme Court has
"steadfastly refused to infer preemption in the field of environmental
protection, an area that lies at the core of the states' police powers."',0 34 The
court's decision to focus on the state's regulatory purpose (environmental
protection) rather than the subject governed by the relevant federal and state
laws (vessels) apparently enabled the court to ignore the fact that, notwithstanding the presumption against preemption, the Supreme Court did
conclude in Ray that Congress has impliedly preempted state laws on tank
vessel safety standards and, by Title II of the PWSA, has occupied the field
1 0 35
of tank vessel construction and design.
The extraordinary aspect of the court's decision in Berman was the court's
failure to reconcile its decision to uphold the state agency's banishment
order with prior Supreme Court decisions holding that states may not
completely prohibit the holder of a federal license from engaging in the
activities that the federal license authorizes. 0 36 All barges transporting oil in
029

1 Berman, 793 F. Supp. at 414.
030
1 An earlier state court decision similarly held against preemption. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of
Huntington, 380 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (upholding, against preemption and Commerce Clause
challenges, a township ordinance that required that persons loading or unloading fuel or oil from vessels

obtain a permit, give advance notice of unloading, and pay into a special fund to provide for cleanup costs
of possible oil spills).
1031435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
32
11 Berman, 793 F. Supp. at 416.
0 33
1 Tribe, supra Part I, note 204, § 6-26, at 487 (concluding that "the basic teaching of the [Ray]
decision is that state pressure to act in derogation of a federal statutory scheme is not to be inferred
lightly").
1034
Berman, 793 F. Supp. at 416. The district court apparently equated the Supreme Court's
presumption against preemption of a state's historic police powers with a "steadfast" refusal to infer
preemption. Closer examination of Ray would have revealed that the Court concluded that Congress had
implicitly preempted state regulation of vessel equipment and safety standards and vessel design and

construction
standards. 435 U.S. at 163-64 & 174.
0 35

1 See supra Part II, notes 638-40 and accompanying text.
0 36
1 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("That no State may
completely exclude federally licensed commerce is indisputable"); see also Huron Portland Cement v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447-48, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
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the coastwise trade must be documented and inspected by the federal
government. 10 37 Beginning with its decision in Gibbons v. Odgen,10 38 the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a vessel's federal license to engage
in the coastwise trade entitles the vessel to navigate in state waters and to
carry out the activity endorsed on its license, and that state laws that deny
those rights are preempted by the federal licensing statute. 0 39 In Ray, the
Court reaffirmed the principle that states may enforce reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures on
federally licensed vessels, 10 40 but nothing in the Ray decision or the cases
cited in Ray condones a state's complete exclusion of federally licensed
vessels from state waters.
Oddly, in upholding the New York law, the court based its decision in part
on findings that there was no evidence that the New York law discouraged
navigation or barred any particular class of vessels from New York
harbors. 1041 Apparently, the court chose to examine the law as written by the
legislature, not as enforced by the DEC through its banishment order.
Finally, the court also understood the Supreme Court's decision in Ray as
establishing a principle that "commerce clause challenges to environmental
protection statutes should not be entertained lightly."' 1 42 Nothing in the
Supreme Court's decision in Ray supports that characterization. The Court's
Commerce Clause analysis in Ray addressed the questions whether the
Washington tug escort requirement fell within the "maritime but local"
exception in Cooley and whether the cost of complying with the escort tug
requirement imposed an undue burden on commerce. 1°4 3 A state order
banishing certain vessels operating in interstate commerce from the state's
waters presents a far different kind of burden on commerce.
° 44
Though many will applaud the DEC for banishing the Berman family'
from New York waters, it is well to remember that federal precedents are not
0 37

1

See 46 US.C. §§ 3301(10) & 12104(2).

1°3822 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
1039See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 280-81, 1977 AMC 566 (1977) (holding
that Gibbons v. Odgen established the principle that a vessel's federal license implies a grant of a right
to navigate in state waters and to carry on the activities listed in the license).
'°4°Ray, 435 U.S. at 164.
104'Berman, 793 F. Supp. at 416.
10421d.
at 417 (citing Ray, 435 U.S. at 179-80).
'043 Ray, 435 U.S. at 179-80 (observing that the estimated cost of complying with the state
requirement for tug escort was less than one cent per barrel of oil transported).
l044The Berman family controlled the corporation that owned the vessels affected by the DEC order.
The family's tug and tank barge operation attracted national attention following the grounding of the tank
barge Morris J. Berman off San Juan, Puerto Rico, and the resulting spill of 798,000 gallons of diesel
oil into Puerto Rican waters. See B. Ornitz, Oil Crisis in Our Oceans 5-8 (1996).
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so easily explained away. 0 45 That the decision has implications well beyond
the notorious Berman family is clear. Substitute the name "China Ocean
Shipping Company" or "Maersk" for the Berman family, and the decision's
far-reaching implications become clear. The vessels banished from New
York waters were not involved in the sinking. The court cited no evidence
that any of the fourteen banished vessels were not in compliance with all
relevant federal laws. 1046 The decision can thus be read as one upholding the
authority of a state to prohibit a vessel owner from operating a fleet of
vessels within state waters, even if those vessels hold all federally-required
documents and inspection certificates. Even more troubling for many will be
the "practical considerations" which informed the court's judgment. The
federal district court concluded that:
Plaintiffs in effect are asking the federal courts to tell New York that it may
not, in the exercise of its police powers, plan against the desecration of its
waters and coasts that would otherwise surely result from the high volume of
oil barge traffic on the state's waterways. Plaintiffs would instead have the
state rely entirely on distant and overextended officials in Washington, D.C.
for basic environmental protections. Such an ineffective scheme is not
47
contemplated by the federal Constitution.'1
Nothing in the court's findings of facts indicates how the court determined
that the state's waters would "surely" be desecrated by spills from a "high
volume of oil barge traffic," unless New York was permitted to ban vessel
operators from its waters, or its conclusion that the "overextended" federal
officials provide only an "ineffective scheme" for protecting the nation's
waterways. 0 48 In Castle v. Hayes Freight Line, Inc., the Supreme Court
rejected the state's argument that without the power to suspend a highway
carrier's privilege to operate in the state, the state would be "without
appropriate remedies to enforce their laws against recalcitrant motor

'°45Justice Black expressed similar concerns regarding state forfeiture actions in his dissent in
C.. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 1943 AMC 156 (1943). He warned that:
Today's in rem action is against a fishnet used in patently illegal fashion; tomorrow's may be an
action against a tramp steamer or ocean liner, which violates a harbor regulation or otherwise
offends against the police regulations of a state or municipality.
Id. at 6154 (Black, J., dissenting).
1°4 Berman, 793 F. Supp. at 410. The DEC Commissioner "claimed that the [corporate owner' s]past
violations of New York Navigation Law indicated that the continued operation of the vessels would
likely result in" future environmental harm.
1047Id.
at. 416-17.

10 48Coast Guard authorities actually worked closely with the State of New York in its investigation
of the Berman/Frank companies and had already taken a number of enforcement actions against the
companies. See Omitz, supra note 1044, at 5-6.
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carriers."' ° 9 The Court responded that "we know of no reason that the
[Interstate Commerce] Commission may not protect the state's interest,
0 50
either on the Commission's own initiative or on complaint of the state."',
When the Berman decision is read together with the Ninth Circuit's
decisions in Hammond and Intertanko, the problems with the traditional
approach and its application come into focus. The decisions point the way
for a possible new federal maritime regulatory regime in which states are
free to prescribe any rules that fall within the rubric of "oil spill prevention
measures," so long as they do not constitute "design requirements"; apply
those rules to U.S. and foreign flag merchant vessels that hold all necessary
federal and flag State licenses and inspection certificates to engage in
foreign and interstate commerce, even if the state rule is stricter than or
different from the governing international or federal standard; and banish
those vessels from state waters if they violate state law. Was this really the
Framers' design or Congress' intent?

'049348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954) (holding that a state's interest in punishing motor carriers for violations
of its road regulations does not justify disruption of federally authorized activities).
05 0
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